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BEYOND “CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT”: THE
REVOLUTION IN JUVENILE INTAKE AND
SENTENCING
Josh Gupta-Kagan*
Abstract: For more than 120 years, juvenile justice law has not substantively defined the
core questions in most delinquency cases—when should the state prosecute children rather
than divert them from the court system (the intake decision), and what should the state do with
children once they are convicted (the sentencing decision)? Instead, the law has granted certain
legal actors wide discretion over these decisions, namely prosecutors at intake and judges at
sentencing. This Article identifies and analyzes an essential reform trend changing that reality:
legislation, enacted in at least eight states in the 2010s, to limit when children can be prosecuted
rather than diverted, and when and for how long they may be incarcerated or kept on probation
based on the specific offense alleged or adjudicated.
These reforms are a sharp turn for juvenile law. Contrary to the field’s long emphasis on
discretionary decisions not legally tethered to specific offenses, the reforms depend on the
charges alleged or proven against a child, and limit judges’ authority at disposition and
prosecutors’ at intake.
This Article fills a gap in the academic literature, which has previously focused on recent
reforms to criminal, not juvenile, court sentencing of children. Recent juvenile court reforms
prevent prosecutors and judges from using wide discretion to incarcerate children for petty
offenses, follow social science research demonstrating how overly punitive actions undermine
rehabilitative goals, and provide important checks and balances on what are often the most
important decisions in individual cases. These juvenile court reforms also enhance the
importance of plea bargaining, and thus risk creating the same harms as have been documented
with plea bargaining in the criminal justice system. This Article argues that risk is mitigated
by limitations on prosecutors’ leverage and that future reforms should include further checks
on that leverage.
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INTRODUCTION
The juvenile justice system has worked to rehabilitate children who
commit crimes since the first juvenile court was established in 1899.1
Through a series of policy reform eras, juvenile justice law has addressed
procedures for determining whether a child is guilty as charged, when
children should be tried in juvenile court versus criminal court, and which
legal actor ought to have control over essential decisions. But legislatures
have largely avoided substantively defining the core questions in most
juvenile delinquency cases—when and for what should children be
prosecuted rather than diverted from the court system (the intake decision)
and what should the state do with children once they are convicted (the
sentencing decision)? Instead, the law has granted certain legal actors
wide discretion over these decisions—prosecutors over intake decisions
and judges over sentencing decisions.2
We are now in the midst of a new reform era—the “children are
different” era, named for a set of United States Supreme Court Eighth

1. See infra section I.A.
2. See infra notes 51–63 and accompanying text.

Gupta-Kagan (Do Not Delete)

2021]

BEYOND “CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT”

6/5/2021 10:22 AM

427

Amendment cases protecting children from the most severe criminal court
sentences3—in which juvenile justice law has finally begun to answer
those central questions for juvenile court cases. Public and scholarly
attention has largely missed this trend, focusing instead on reforms related
to sentencing children convicted of serious offenses in criminal court.
This Article identifies and analyzes an essential and underappreciated
element to the current reform era—dramatic reforms to juvenile court
intake (the decision whether to prosecute, divert,4 or dismiss charges
against a child) and sentencing.5 These reforms, enacted in at least eight
states in the 2010s, limit when children can be prosecuted in juvenile
court, how long they may be kept on juvenile probation, and when they
may be incarcerated. These limits depend on the offense for which a child
is charged or convicted, contrary to the juvenile justice system’s historic
de-emphasis of such details. Thus, these reforms impose significant limits
on the previously largely unchecked authority of juvenile prosecutors at
intake and juvenile court judges at sentencing.
These reforms sharply turn away from juvenile justice law’s historic
and (in most states) continuing emphasis on discretionary, offender-based
(not offense-based) sentencing. Originally, authorities considered a
child’s specific offense less important than whatever underlying problem
led to the offense. The juvenile court judge’s task was to identify that
underlying problem and order a sentence to address that problem, and
3. The phrase “children are different” (and a variation, “children are constitutionally different”)
appears repeatedly in the Supreme Court’s decision prohibiting mandatory life without sentences for
children. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471, 480–81 (2012). Juvenile justice scholars use the
phrase to name the present era of juvenile justice law and policy, dating it to 2005, when the Supreme
Court decided Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), which prohibited capital punishment for
crimes committed under the age of eighteen. E.g., Barry C. Feld, Competence and Culpability:
Delinquents in Juvenile Courts, Youths in Criminal Courts, 102 MINN. L. REV. 473, 474 (2017).
4. The federal government defines diversion programs as “alternatives to initial or continued formal
processing of youth in the juvenile delinquency system.” Diversion Programs, YOUTH.GOV,
https://youth.gov/youth-topics/juvenile-justice/diversion-programs [https://perma.cc/76TH-4XH7];
see also OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LITERATURE REVIEW:
DIVERSION FROM FORMAL JUVENILE COURT PROCESSING (2017), https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/
xyckuh176/files/media/document/diversion_programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK9R-ETX8]. Because
diversion generally avoids formal court processing, children whose cases are diverted do not usually
get convicted of a crime or face the direct consequences of conviction (such as the risk of
incarceration) or collateral consequences of such a conviction. Id.
5. By “sentencing,” I refer to the court-ordered consequence following a child’s conviction for
committing an act of delinquency, typically defined as an act that would be a crime if the child were
an adult. Most juvenile justice codes use different terminology for a range of procedural actions with
close parallels in criminal court—in particular for this Article, “disposition” in place of “sentencing.”
E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-1410 (2021). This Article will use the term “sentencing” for its broader
understanding beyond those familiar with juvenile justice jargon, because that term reflects the
element of punishment inherently present in this stage of a delinquency case, and because that is one
feature of the reforms discussed in this Article.
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legislation granted juvenile court judges wide discretion to do exactly
that.6 Focusing on the offender rather than the offense was a pillar of
juvenile justice that distinguished it from criminal justice and facilitated a
rehabilitative approach.
The turn away from this founding vision seeks to prevent actions which
run counter to social science evidence regarding effective rehabilitation,
especially research highlighting how overly punitive actions lead to high
recidivism rates.7 Prosecuting children often leads to higher recidivism
rates than diversion.8 Longer probation periods lack support in our
expanding knowledge of adolescent development.9 Incarceration can
increase recidivism in at least two ways: it can traumatize children, and it
can expose children who have not committed particularly severe offenses
to other children who have.10 Once children are incarcerated, holding
them for relatively longer periods does not lead to less recidivism.11 All
of these findings support offense-based limits on juvenile court intake and
sentencing decisions as a tool to further rehabilitative goals.
Procedurally, these reforms impose significant limits on the authority
of judges at disposition and prosecutors at intake. Historically, juvenile
justice statutes entrusted judges with wide discretion to impose whatever
sentence they believed to be in a child’s best interest, and that wide
discretion coincided with informal procedures that lacked basic due
process protections.12 Judges could and did place children in state custody
following convictions for the most minor of offenses, most (in)famously
for a prank phone call.13 Even when the United States Supreme Court
engaged in a “constitutional domestication” effort regarding these
juvenile court procedures14 and explicitly recognized problems in

6. See infra section I.A.
7. See infra notes 163–165, 200–202, 226–232, 249–262 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 249–262 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 226–232 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 163–165 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 200–202 and accompanying text.
12. See infra section I.B.
13. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4, 7–8 (1967) (describing commitment of a fifteen-year-old boy to
a “State Industrial School” for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his twenty-first birthday
after conviction for making a phone call to a neighbor “in which the caller or callers made lewd or
indecent remarks . . . of the irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety”).
14. Id. at 22. The Court “domesticat[ed]” juvenile procedure by requiring that juvenile courts begin
following certain due process requirements, including providing children accused of crimes with the
right to notice of the charges against them, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against
them, the right against compelled self-incrimination, and the right to counsel. Id. at 33–34, 42,
55–56.
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discretionary sentencing,15 it left this wide sentencing discretion
untouched.16 And it has remained largely untouched until recently. By
adding offense-based limits to who can be incarcerated, recent reforms
represent the most significant limit on juvenile court judges’ authority in
the institution’s history.
The present reform wave’s regulation of intake decisions could
represent a dramatic set of limits on juvenile court prosecutors’ authority
over those decisions. Authority over intake decisions originally rested
with juvenile court judges and their staff but gradually shifted to
prosecutors as an indirect effect of the Supreme Court’s constitutional
domestication cases.17 Once prosecutors acquired this intake power,
juvenile court judges maintained some ability to dismiss cases that
prosecutors chose to prosecute. But standards for doing so remained
vague, and prosecutors maintained wide discretion to make essential
decisions about which children would face prosecution and which could
enter a diversion program. Recent reforms put stronger and more specific
limits on this authority, both limiting which cases can be prosecuted
(again, with a focus on the specific offenses charged) and clarifying how
judges can review prosecutors’ intake decisions.
These reforms have thus far received less analysis than the Supreme
Court’s “children are different” cases regarding criminal court sentencing
of children. Ongoing efforts to extend those rulings have focused on
applying “children are different” analysis to either criminal court
sentencing (to address long sentences that are the equivalent of life in
prison18 or mandatory minimum sentences)19 or police investigation (such
15. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
17. See Josh Gupta-Kagan, Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors: Elected and Agency
Prosecutors and Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Delinquency and Child Protection Cases, 85
U. CHI. L. REV. 743, 770–82 (2018).
18. See, e.g., State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197, 201–03 (N.J. 2017) (applying Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), “to sentences that are the practical
equivalent of life without parole,” including a sentence of fifty-five years before the defendant was
parole-eligible); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 34–35, 334 P.3d 132, 142–43 (Wyo. 2014)
(“As a practical matter, a juvenile offender sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years sentence will not
have a ‘meaningful opportunity for release.’”); People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 293, 295 (Cal.
2012) (consecutive sentence of 110 years imposed on a juvenile for a non-homicide offense was
unconstitutional). But see Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding Graham “does
not clearly establish that consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juveniles who have committed
multiple nonhomicide offenses are unconstitutional when they amount to the practical equivalent of
life without parole”).
19. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared any mandatory sentencing scheme applied to a child to
violate the Iowa Constitution. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa 2014) (“[W]e hold a statute
mandating a sentence of incarceration in a prison for juvenile offenders with no opportunity for parole
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as an appreciation of how children’s development should impact the law
of police interrogation and determinations of the admissibility of young
suspects’ statements).20 Juvenile court intake and sentencing reforms are
equally, if not more dramatic and deserve close analysis because of the
changes to juvenile justice law and practice that they represent, and
because they may augur similar reforms across the country. Yet scholars
have not studied them in the same manner. This Article seeks to fill that
void by analyzing these state legislative reforms, which represent a
significant extension of the present reform era beyond criminal
court sentencing.
Analysis of recent juvenile court intake and sentencing reforms must
examine the superficial similarity between recent offense-specific reforms
and more punitive tough-on-crime reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. Those
reforms also expanded offense-specific rules for when children would be
exposed to adult criminal sentences or some severe juvenile sentences.21
Like those older reforms, “children are different” era reforms undermine
the juvenile court’s historic focus on offender-based dispositions.
Crucially, however, recent reforms do so in a way that is less punitive and
more rehabilitative. In the tough-on-crime era “[d]oubts about juvenile
courts’ ability to treat young offenders or protect public safety bolstered
get tough policies.”22 The present era features similar doubts about the
efficacy of juvenile court interventions, but those doubts lead to a different
direction—limiting juvenile court power and discretion as a means of
limiting the harms of juvenile court intervention. While the
tough-on-crime era’s offense-based reforms led some scholars to question
whether a separate juvenile justice system is valuable—arguing that if
children are exposed to punitive, offense-based sentences, the law should
at least give them the full procedural protections of the criminal system—
until a minimum period of time has been served is unconstitutional . . . .”). The Washington State
Supreme Court has granted judges discretion to sentence children to terms below statutory minima.
See State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wash. 2d 1, 21, 391 P.3d 409, 420 (2017). Most other courts to
address the question have declined to apply a similar rule in other states. See, e.g., Burrell v. State,
207 A.3d 137, 141–45 (Del. 2019) (upholding a statute imposing a mandatory minimum sentence);
State v. Smith, 836 S.E.2d 348, 350 (S.C. 2019) (approving mandatory minimum sentence applied to
juveniles along with “the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions” to consider the issue, and collecting
cases). The Virginia legislature has enacted a statute prohibiting mandatory minimum sentences for
children. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272(A)(3) (2021).
20. See, e.g., Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 312, 318 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (acknowledging
in federal habeas case that “[a] number of relevant factors . . . tend to support Dassey’s claims” that
his confession was involuntary, but holding that state court decision deciding otherwise did not
unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent).
21. See infra notes 96–97.
22. BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE
CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 107 (2017).
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the current reform trend reinforces the need for a separate system to
impose offense-based consequences designed around children-specific
rehabilitative ends.
These recent trends, starting with reforms in Georgia in 2013, apply
ideas first raised in a set of American Bar Association proposals in the
1970s and 1980s which endorsed offense-based upper limits on juvenile
court sentences.23 While the ideas behind these reforms were present for
decades, most focus on reform efforts from the early 2010s emphasized
programmatic shifts, not legal shifts.24 Offense-based limits have become
a growing statutory trend as reforms expanded from Georgia to at least
seven other states in the years since 2013.25
This trend has much to recommend it. It prevents historically wide
discretion in the juvenile justice system from leading to incarcerating
children for petty offenses and the harms that flow from such
incarceration. It recognizes that no judge or prosecutor should wield such
unchecked power, and imposes important limits on the most invasive
actions that can be taken—decisions to prosecute a child at intake and to
incarcerate a child at sentencing. It follows empirical research about what
actions best serve the system’s rehabilitative goals, and limits the
well-established harms that come from unnecessary prosecution and
incarceration. Its offense-specific focus helps children understand
decisions made by the system as directly connected to their conduct rather
than the whims of authority figures.
Moreover, while empirical evidence is limited, offense-based limits on
discretion could reduce the wide racial disparities in the juvenile justice
system by limiting the implicit bias which can creep into discretionary
decisions.26 The juvenile justice field has long correlated discretionary
decisions with large racial disparities,27 so limiting discretion could
reasonably be theorized to reduce those disparities. Empirical data is
limited on this point and existing data do not show reductions in racial
disparities,28 but continued focus on this question is warranted.
These reforms also come with a significant risk: enhancing the
importance of the specific offense for which a child is convicted makes
plea bargaining more important. That, in turn, risks some of the same
23. See infra notes 153–159 and accompanying text.
24. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH
33, 41–45 (Richard J. Bonnie, Robert L. Johnson, Betty M. Chemers & Julie A. Schuck eds., 2013)
[hereinafter REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE].
25. See infra sections II.A–C.
26. See infra notes 364–365 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 364–365 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 366–370 and accompanying text.
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harms that rampant plea bargaining has caused for the criminal justice
system: diminishment of the fact-finding function of trials, and
prosecutors’ threat of punishment under top charges pressuring
defendants to accept plea bargains regardless of their guilt or the state’s
ability to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. These risks are
exacerbated by widespread deficits in public juvenile defense systems, but
mitigated by the imposition of offense-based maximum limits on
sentences—limiting the leverage gained by prosecutors filing more severe
charges—and by intake reforms imposing some checks on prosecutors’
charging authority. Further checks on state power—procedures to
challenge intake decisions to prosecute children, limits on pre-trial
detention, and reconsideration of jury trial rights—will form important
elements of continuing reform efforts to further mitigate these risks.29
Part I of this Article outlines the juvenile justice system’s historic
commitment to discretionary, offender-based decision-making at intake
and sentencing. It reviews due process reforms to the trial and
adjudication stage of delinquency cases—and how those reforms left the
wide discretion at intake and sentencing intact. It surveys offense-based
reforms from the tough-on-crime era and how those undermined both
juvenile justice law’s historic commitment to offender-based decisions
and its rehabilitative focus.
Part II describes the essential offense-based intake and sentencing
reforms of the present reform era, the empirical research which supports
those reforms, and the conditions which suggest that this reform trend can
continue to grow.
Part III evaluates those reforms, explaining how they differ from
tough-on-crime era offense-based reforms and go beyond reforms directly
triggered by the Supreme Court’s line of Eighth Amendment juvenile
sentencing cases. Part III explains how these reforms could also address
persistent and glaring racial disparities in juvenile justice case processing,
although empirical data remains unclear. Part III will also explore how
these offense-based reforms elevate the importance of plea bargaining and
its attendant risks, and how the juvenile justice system balances those risks
through the somewhat different role of prosecutors in those cases.
Part IV offers several suggestions for future reforms, including
expanding offense-based reforms to pre-trial detention statutes, and how
to more strongly ensure checks and balances on charging decisions given
their increased importance under offense-based intake and
sentencing statutes.

29. See infra Part IV.
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HISTORICALLY WIDE DISCRETION AND
OFFENDER-BASED INTAKE AND SENTENCING

The juvenile court was designed to give judges wide discretion to
consider the most important things about children to determine what
intervention was in their best interest.30 The actual offense a child
committed was not expected to be among those most important things.31
As flaws in juvenile court practice became increasingly apparent, the
Supreme Court, starting with the landmark juvenile justice case In re
Gault,32 induced a set of due process reforms focused on the adjudicative
phase of juvenile courts.33 These reforms explicitly left the wide discretion
and offender-based orientation intact at intake and sentencing, even with
the flaws of that system apparent in Gault.34
The first significant limit on this discretion and offender-based
orientation came in the tough-on-crime era reforms of the 1980s and
1990s.35 Prosecutors obtained greater power to determine whether to
prosecute or divert children, and the proportion of cases prosecuted
increased.36 Legislatures limited judges’ discretion by creating and
expanding offense-based rules for when children would be prosecuted in
criminal court and what sentences judges could impose. Such limits on
judicial discretion and sentencing reforms were widely understood to
impose a more punitive orientation on all aspects of juvenile justice law
and practice, and raised existential questions about the juvenile
court’s future.
A.

Founding Vision

From its origins, the juvenile court featured wide discretion granted to
judges, who were expected to impose offender-based, not offense-based
dispositions, identifying the root causes of a child’s delinquency through
whatever order would serve the individual offender. According to one
early proponent, writing in 1909, a juvenile court judge’s task is less about
identifying “a specific wrong,” but determining instead about a child:
“What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in
his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 21, 24–25, 27–31.
See infra section I.B.1.
See infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
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downward career.”37
Scholars and practitioners have consistently described the juvenile
court’s dispositional discretion similarly. Consider this illustrative
description from leading juvenile justice scholar Barry Feld writing in
2017: “Traditionally, juvenile courts imposed indeterminate
nonproportional dispositions. If delinquency was only a symptom of a
child’s needs, then what she did had little bearing on what she might need
to change.”38 Other leading authorities have written similarly.39
Simultaneously, the juvenile court was intended to divert children from
the more punitive criminal justice system—and thus ensure that children
received less punitive responses. The juvenile system existed “[t]o get
away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a criminal,”40
following the notion that the criminal courts would be overly punitive to
children and lead to more recidivism over time.41 As one recent
publication put it, the juvenile justice system sought “to ensure that youths
were not treated the same as adults” and could avoid the “most restrictive
placements” associated with the criminal system.42
Implementing this vision required granting juvenile court judges
remarkably wide discretion. The first statute creating modern juvenile
courts—Illinois’s 1899 Juvenile Court Act—gave judges wide discretion
to leave children at home, order them “to be placed in a suitable family
home,” or send them to juvenile prisons (euphemistically called a
“training school,” “industrial school,” or “State reformatory”) for an
indeterminate period of time.43 Crucially, the statute included no provision
limiting the court’s discretion regarding which disposition to impose; it
provided that “[i]n the case of a delinquent child, the court may” order
any of the listed options.44 The only limits on the court’s authority was
that it could not incarcerate children in adult facilities, and not past a

37. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909).
38. FELD, supra note 22, at 136.
39. See, e.g., REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 183 (writing that “[t]he founding
model of the juvenile court dispensed with offense-related considerations altogether in deciding what
should be done with the delinquent youth,” focusing instead on whatever a judge determined would
best rehabilitate the child).
40. Mack, supra note 37, at 109.
41. See id. at 106–07 (criticizing the common law’s failure to distinguish the need to punish adults
and children equally and asserting that criminal court punishments “criminalized [children] by the
very methods that it used in dealing with them”).
42. CHRISTOPHER J. SULLIVAN, TAKING JUVENILE JUSTICE SERIOUSLY: DEVELOPMENTAL
INSIGHTS AND SYSTEM CHALLENGES 49 (2019).
43. Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 § 9, reprinted in JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Fall 1998, at 3.
44. Id.
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certain age.45 When courts committed children to the custody of a juvenile
prison, discretion over when they would be released shifted to those
institutions, which would determine if the child would go home relatively
quickly or remain incarcerated until turning the maximum age.46
Juvenile court judges’ wide discretion at disposition persists in most
states. The Illinois statute has been substantially rewritten since its 1899
enactment, but maintains judges’ sentencing discretion:
At the sentencing hearing, the court shall determine whether it is
in the best interests of the minor or the public that he or she be
made a ward of the court, and, if [so], the court shall determine
the proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and
the public.47
The judge should consider a wide range of information—“[a]ll evidence
helpful in determining these questions,” continuing offender-based
sentencing.48 Other states typically have similar statutes.49
This wide discretion de-emphasizes the specific charge under which a
child is convicted; the judge’s dispositional authority is the same whether
the child is convicted of, for instance, misdemeanor simple assault or
felony assault in the first degree. For adults in criminal court in South
Carolina, the former triggers a maximum sentence of thirty days in jail
while the latter triggers a maximum sentence of up to ten years.50
By separating the court’s dispositional authority from the specific
adjudicated charge, statutes granting wide discretion to judges lessen the
importance of plea bargaining in juvenile practice. In adult criminal court,
offense-specific sentencing differences incentivize plea bargaining—the
threat of ten years imprisonment for a charge of assault in the first degree
is the leverage the state uses to induce a plea to assault in the second or
third degree.51 Writing in 2019, a juvenile defense manual emphasizes that
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/5-705(1) (2020).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 352.2(2)(a) (Consol. 2020) (empowering, with exceptions for
the most serious offenses, judges to enter “an appropriate order” based on considering the “best
interests of the respondent as well as the need for protection of the community”); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-19-1410(A) (2020) (permitting judges to decide between any listed option ranging from
terminating jurisdiction to committing the child to a state agency).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-600(C)(2), (E)(2) (2021).
51. The “greatest single incentive for guilty pleas” is typically that by pleading guilty to some lesser
charge than what is alleged, a defendant can ensure that he will not face the greater punishment
authorized by the more severe charge which is alleged against him. RANDY HERTZ, MARTIN
GUGGENHEIM & ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY CASES 395 (2019), https://njdc.info/trial-manual-for-defense-attorneys-in-juvenile-
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the benefit of reduced sentences is not available “in the vast majority of
jurisdictions” that have dispositions entirely untethered from adjudicated
offenses.52 A separate juvenile defense manual makes clear that the
specific charge adjudicated—felony as charged or misdemeanor as pled—
would drive potential sentences for adults, but “mattered little” in juvenile
court, because the judge can impose the same disposition regardless of the
charge.53 Even when elements of certain charges defined as aggravating
factors in criminal law were dropped as part of a plea bargain, juvenile
court judges would often hear those alleged (and unproven and
unadjudicated) facts at disposition.54
One consequence of the wide discretion granted to judges as part of
offender-specific sentencing has been the inconsistent handling of similar
cases from one local jurisdiction to another.55 A child’s specific offense
surely matters in practice; violent offenses are consistently more likely to
lead to incarceration than more minor offenses, for instance.56 But the
wide discretion permits some minor offenses to lead to placements in
juvenile institutions and some serious offenses not to,57 with individual
judges holding wide power to determine the outcome in individual cases.
Wide discretion over both intake and sentencing decisions has also
correlated with significant racial disparities.58 Across all categories of
offenses, Black children are less likely to be diverted and more likely to
be incarcerated than White children.59 This correlation suggests the
hypothesis that implicit or explicit bias may infect these decisions, with
the discretion provided prosecutors at intake and judges at disposition
effectively limiting the legal system’s ability to review these decisions.
In addition to their discretion at disposition, juvenile courts historically
could determine which children would be prosecuted. Originally, “[a]ny
reputable person” could file a petition to initiate a delinquency case, which

delinquency-cases-by-randy-hertz-martin-guggenheim-anthony-g-amsterdam/
[https://perma.cc/E8BZ-V3P9] (choose “Chapter 14—Guilty Pleas”).
52. Id. at 406.
53. MARTIN LARRY SCHWIMMER, JUVENILE COURT FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS REVISED 136
(2019).
54. See, e.g., id. at 177 (describing one such ruling by a juvenile court judge).
55. See REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 50 (“Young people charged with
committing similar acts of delinquency may be handled quite differently, depending on the state or
county in which they live . . . .”).
56. See id. at 75 (providing placement rates for a variety of offenses and offense categories).
57. See id.
58. See infra notes 364–365.
59. Statistical Briefing Book: Racial and Ethnic Fairness, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/special_topics/
qa11603.asp?qaDate=2018 [https://perma.cc/TK76-E4CM].
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would trigger a summons and a hearing.60 Relatively quickly, the number
of complaints became large enough that some kind of triage became
necessary to determine which cases to prosecute, which to dismiss, and
which to divert.61 By the 1920s, court probation officers began exercising
this prosecutorial discretion.62 In the modern era, this discretion shifted
from court staff to prosecutors, often with some role for state juvenile
justice agencies.63 While who exercised this discretion changed, the scope
of this intake discretion remained.
Juvenile justice authorities have long recognized the importance of
sound intake decisions and frequent use of diversion rather than
prosecution. In the 1920s, authorities recommended that family-court
probation officers not pursue formal charges and instead seek diversion—
then called informal adjustment—“whenever feasible.”64 As a 1967
federal commission wrote, hearing delinquency cases in a separate court
from criminal cases depended on a more rehabilitative emphasis at intake:
“If there is a defensible philosophy for the juvenile court it is one of
judicious nonintervention.”65
This emphasis on diversion faded somewhat as prosecutors became a
tool of tough-on-crime reforms in the 1980s and 1990s and took authority
over intake decisions from judicial staff.66 As that shift occurred, the
frequency of diversion began to fall.67 The percentage of cases dismissed
or diverted fell—and the percentage of cases prosecuted rose from
roughly 43% in 198568 to 55% in 1998 and 1999,69 and has remained fairly
60. Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 §§ 4–5, reprinted in JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Fall 1998, at 2.
Similar procedures existed in other jurisdictions.
61. See H. Ted Rubin, The Emerging Prosecutor Dominance of the Juvenile Court Intake Process,
26 CRIME & DELINQ. 299, 301 (1980).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 299; see also Gupta-Kagan, supra note 17, at 770–82 (describing shift in
intake authority).
64. HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 224 (1927). Legislative reforms
calling for “informal adjustments” noted their “great[ ] significance” to improved intake decisions.
Noah Weinstein, The Juvenile Court Concept in Missouri: Its Historical Development—The Need for
New Legislation, 1957 WASH. U. L.Q. 17, 38.
65. Edwin M. Lemert, The Juvenile Court—Quest and Realities, in TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 91, 96 (1967).
66. See Rubin, supra note 61, at 299.
67. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 17, at 776–80.
68. Statistical Briefing Book: Delinquency Cases, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatBB/court/qa06401.asp
[https://perma.cc/W6EE-9TVQ] (reflecting that the juvenile justice authorities formally handled
530,300 cases out of 1,159,400 cases in 1985). This website links to data that provide specific
numbers for each year. Id.
69. Id. (memorializing the 3,538,600 cases total in 1998 and 1999, with 2,027,900
formally pursued).
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steady since.70
B.

Juvenile Court Failures and Reforms

The juvenile court did not live up to the ideals of its founding,
eventually leading to “constitutional domestication” by the Supreme
Court in In re Gault.71 Gault marked the beginning of the due process
reform era, the first major era of juvenile justice reform. That era focused
on procedural regularity at adjudication, but not intake or disposition.
1.

In re Gault and Reforms of Adjudicative—Not Dispositional or
Intake—Procedures

The facts of the United States Supreme Court’s leading juvenile justice
reform cases illustrated the problem of unchecked discretion at
disposition, as previous commentators have noted,72 but the Court’s
decisions did nothing to limit that discretion.
In re Gault—the 1967 case which imposed basic due process
protections for child defendants in delinquency cases—featured a child
convicted of a minor offense and incarcerated for far more time than
would have been possible if he were an adult.73 An Arizona juvenile court
convicted fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault of making a lewd phone call to a
neighbor.74 For an adult violating this law, the Arizona legislature
imposed a maximum punishment of imprisonment up to two months or a
fine of $5 to $50,75 but the juvenile court imposed a much more severe
sentence on Gerald—an indeterminate commitment to the state training
school up to his twenty-first birthday, which would have meant nearly six
years in state custody.76 Gerald served almost three years, and was
70. For instance, in 2018, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reported
322,400 cases handled informally (43.3% of the total) and 422,100 handled formally (56.7% of
the total).
71. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967). The Court imposed certain basic due process protections on
the adjudication phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. See supra note 14.
72. STANDARDS RELATING TO JUV. DELINQ. & SANCTIONS 37 (INST. OF JUD. ADMIN. & AM. BAR
ASS’N 1977) [hereinafter JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS] (“That the juvenile court’s customarily
broad discretionary power to commit juveniles to confinement is more than theoretical is
demonstrated by the case of Gerald Gault . . . .”) (tentative draft).
73. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 7–8.
74. See id. at 8. In the language of the statute, it was a misdemeanor to “use[] vulgar, abusive or
obscene language” when “in the presence or hearing of any woman or child.” Id. The alleged call at
issue was made with another boy—the precise role of and words spoken by Gerald were unclear—to
a female neighbor identified by the Court as “Mrs. Cook.” Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 8–9.
76. See id. at 7–8. A similar, but less dramatic disparity was evident in a later case, In re Winship,
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released only upon the Supreme Court’s reversal of his conviction.77 This
sentence raised concerns about how indeterminate, offender-based
sentencing could undermine rather than promote the system’s
rehabilitative goals. Gault himself later said his incarceration left him
“mean, angry, and ready to fight,”78 a description consistent with
subsequent research showing the harms to children and society of
unnecessary incarceration.79
Beyond the stark reality that children faced longer periods of
incarceration than adults convicted of the same offenses, the Supreme
Court also expressed concern about how juvenile court judges exercised
their wide discretion. Gault explicitly raised concerns why the juvenile
court placed Gerald Gault in state custody for up to six years given the
relatively minor nature of his alleged offense and his family situation:
“Under traditional notions, one would assume . . . the Juvenile Judge
would have made a careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility that
the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home,” an inquiry the Court
suggested was lacking.80 More broadly, the Court raised concerns about
the absence of “careful, compassionate, individualized treatment”—the
very things wide discretion at disposition hearings was supposed
to facilitate.81
Nonetheless, the Court made clear that it would issue no ruling
regarding “the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the
pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor . . . the post-adjudicative or
dispositional process.”82 Gault made clear that the Supreme Court was not
going to regulate the wide discretion that defined juvenile justice intake

though to a much less severe degree. 397 U.S. 358, 359–60 (1970) (holding that the state must prove
its case in juvenile court beyond a reasonable doubt). Samuel Winship, a twelve-year-old boy, was
charged with having “entered a locker and stole[] $112 from a woman’s pocketbook.” Id. at 360.
Samuel was subject to a sentence of up to six years in state custody; he was placed in a “training
school” for eighteen months, subject to annual extensions until his eighteenth birthday. Id. In contrast,
an adult convicted of the same offense could get a maximum of five years in prison, a point Samuel’s
lawyer emphasized at oral argument. Oral Argument at 1:08, Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (No. 778),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1969/778 [https://perma.cc/7BMR-KPDH].
77. Just. Talking, Juvenile Justice 40 Years After In re Gault, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 24, 2007),
https://web.archive.org/web/20080918190645/http://www.justicetalking.org/transcripts/071224_Ga
ult_transcript.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
78. Id.
79. See infra notes 162–170 and accompanying text.
80. Gault, 387 U.S. at 28.
81. Id. at 18.
82. Id. at 13; see also id. at 31 n.48 (“The problems of pre-adjudication treatment of juveniles, and
of post-adjudication disposition, are unique to the juvenile process; hence what we hold in this opinion
with regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability to
other steps of the juvenile process.”).
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or disposition; it “ignored entirely the substance” of juvenile law—the
“unique sentencing or dispositional powers accorded to [juvenile
court] judges.”83
The Gault Court’s avoidance of any decision that might remedy the
severe flaws it identified in Gerald Gault’s disposition reflected the debate
in that case whether due process protections were incompatible with the
juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative goals.84 The dissenting opinion in
Gault worried that imposing more procedural requirements on juvenile
court proceedings would undermine their rehabilitative purposes and
“convert a juvenile proceeding into a criminal prosecution.”85 Aware of
this argument in support of the status quo, Gault’s lawyer, Norman
Dorsen, emphasized at oral argument that imposing due process on the
adjudicative phase of juvenile cases would leave “the best part” of
juvenile court in place—dispositions.86 Dorsen knew well that disposition
practices left much to be desired,87 and this statement was
“entirely strategic.”88
The strategy worked, granting Gault and Dorsen a resounding victory
and the imposition of fundamental due process protections before juvenile
courts could declare a child guilty.89 But this victory was limited to
adjudication procedures that did not regulate the intake and disposition
phases of juvenile court where the rehabilitative approach most directly
applied.90 Thus, even with revolutionary due process reforms, wide
charging and sentencing discretion continued.
Gault’s limited focus on adjudicative procedures has led commentators
to describe it as “merely the first step in the cleansing of [juvenile courts’]
flaws,”91 and criticize it as a “missed opportunity” to make intake and
sentencing procedures “more true to the juvenile justice vision.”92 A

83. Martin Guggenheim, The Due Process Revolution in Juvenile Court—New York and the Early
Years After Gault, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM: 50 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 79, 79 (Kristin Henning, Laura Cohen & Ellen Marrus eds., 2018) (emphasis
in original).
84. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
85. Id. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86. Norman Dorsen, Foreword to DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY:
PRACTICE IN A UNIQUE COURT, at xvii (1974).
87. See id.
88. Guggenheim, supra note 83, at 80.
89. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 30–31.
90. See id. at 31 n.48.
91. Zawadi Baharanyi & Randy Hertz, The Many Stories of In re Gault, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND
REFORM: 50 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3, 10 (Kristin Henning,
Laura Cohen & Ellen Marrus eds., 2018).
92. Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 42–43 (2003).
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second step of “cleansing” intake and disposition law did not occur until
the most recent reform trend discussed in Part II.
2.

Later Challenges to Juvenile Court Disposition Authority Fail

Children’s defenders did not give up their efforts to limit juvenile court
sentences, especially when, as in Gault, a juvenile court ordered a child to
serve a longer sentence than an adult guilty of the same offense could.93
When children’s defense attorneys raised equal protection challenges,
courts overwhelmingly rejected them, reasoning that the rehabilitative
purposes of juvenile court dispositions made children dissimilarly situated
from adults in criminal court.94 Longer juvenile court dispositions were
rationally related to those purposes, so the discretion to impose longer
sentences on a child than would be possible on adults remained—and, in
most states, remain.95
C.

Tough-on-Crime Era Reforms, and Calls to Abolish the Juvenile
Court

One era of juvenile court reform did change juvenile court sentences,
but in a more punitive direction—the tough-on-crime era of the 1980s and
1990s. Facing an increase in crime, including juvenile crime, and
skepticism that juvenile courts and juvenile justice agencies could fulfill
their rehabilitative mission, state legislatures enacted a range of changes.
Those reforms marked a shift towards offense-based sentencing and
more punitive juvenile court sentences for many specific offenses. Facing
crime rates which peaked in the early 1990s, and inaccurate and racialized
fears of “super-predator[]” youth, state legislatures enacted a range of
“tough-on-crime” reforms.96 The highest profile set of changes featured
more offense-based limits on family court jurisdiction, especially
expanded waiver or transfer of children’s cases to criminal court, leading
to more criminal court sentences for more severe offenses.97 In addition,
many states adopted more offense-based sentencing practices in juvenile
court, including offense-specific parole release guidelines,98 and
93. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
94. E.g., In re A.M.H., 447 N.W.2d 40, 43–45 (Neb. 1989); In re Eric J., 601 P.2d 549, 553–54
(Cal. 1979); J.K. v. State., 228 N.W.2d 713, 715–16 (Wis. 1975); Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941,
945, 948 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); see also A.M.H., 447 N.W.2d at 45 (collecting cases).
95. See supra notes 47–50.
96. See FELD, supra note 22, at chs.3 & 4.
97. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes
in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 494–99 (1987).
98. See FELD, supra note 22, at 137.
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minimum offense-specific juvenile court sentences.99 Multiple states
amended the purpose clauses of juvenile justice statutes to place greater
emphasis on punishing children.100 Collectively, these reforms were
understood as dramatic steps away from the rehabilitative ideal towards
criminal court sentencing focused on punishment and deterrence.101 In the
tough-on-crime era, this shift was accompanied by a skepticism that child
offenders were much different from adult offenders.102 In addition, the
shift towards more prosecutorial control over intake decisions and
prosecuting (rather than diverting or dismissing) a greater proportion of
cases,103 occurred in this era.
These reforms and this more punitive orientation led juvenile court
prosecutors, probation officers, and judges to prosecute children more
frequently and place children in state custody with greater frequency. The
proportion of cases prosecuted rather than dismissed or diverted increased
about 10%.104 In the aggregate, dispositions were tied to offenses.105 But
the National Research Council (NRC) documented how, from 1985–2008,
authorities used their discretion to incarcerate children more frequently;
the percentage of a wide variety of relatively minor charges leading to
juvenile “placement” in the state’s legal custody and in a state facility
increased sharply.106 Placements increased from 3.5% of all vandalism
cases to 6.4%, accounting for almost 4,000 more children.107 Placements
for “other public order” offenses doubled from 2.5% to 5.1%.108
Placements increased from 10.3% to 16.4% of stolen property offenses,
and 2.7% to 3.6% of disorderly conduct offenses.109 The number of
children placed for simple assault cases increased by 13,700.110
Viewing this shift towards more punitive sentencing in juvenile court,
some scholars began calling for its abolition. If juvenile courts would
impose more severe sanctions than historically intended, but without the
99. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and
Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 83 (1997).
100. Id.
101. See FELD, supra note 22, at 137; NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME,
JUVENILE JUSTICE 210 (Joan McCord, Cathy Spatz Widom & Nancy A. Crowell eds., 2001)
[hereinafter JUVENILE CRIME].
102. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 32.
103. See supra notes 63, 67–70 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 69–70.
105. See Feld, supra note 99, at 83–84.
106. See REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 74.
107. See id. at 74–76.
108. See id. at 74.
109. Id. at 75.
110. Id.
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full due process rights granted to adult criminal defendants,111 then they
were simply a “deficient criminal court,” as Professor Barry Feld argued
in 1997.112 Some critics reviewed juvenile court sentences and described
its historic promise of individualized sentences as “a cruel hoax.”113 Feld
argued that children would be better served with the full procedural
protections of criminal court coupled with criminal sentencing laws that
would treat youth as a mitigating factor.114 Feld advocated for a “youth
discount” at sentencing—a sliding scale, percentage discount in possible
sentence lengths based on the age of the child.115 He suggested, for
instance, that a fourteen-year-old be limited to 25–33% of an adult
penalty, and a sixteen-year-old 50–60%.116
This proposal would have transformed juvenile sentencing entirely into
an offense-based enterprise, offering little means for individualized
consideration. Moreover, through the proposal’s focus on children’s
relatively lower level of culpability,117 Feld implicitly conceded that
retribution for crime rather than rehabilitation of young offenders would
be the primary motivation for sentences. It was, Feld wrote in 2017, a
reflection of his “despair over the punitiveness of delinquency sanctions”
and an effort to reduce those sanctions in the context of that punitive
shift.118 Even some defenses of the juvenile court argued not that it
provided a rehabilitative model, but it nonetheless “shields at least some
younger offenders from the draconian penalties of the criminal
justice system.”119
111. Through a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court granted juvenile defendants
protection against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, to confrontation against witnesses, and to
notice of charges against them, and required states to prove children guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 385–86 (1970). But the Court also
held that children in juvenile court were not entitled to trials by jury, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 528 (1971), and could be arrested and detained for longer than adult defendants could be
before being granted a hearing, Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984).
112. Feld, supra note 99, at 69; see also id. at 90 (describing tough-on-crime era reforms as
“hav[ing] transformed the juvenile court from its original model as a social service agency into a
deficient second-rate criminal court that provides young people with neither positive treatment nor
criminal procedural justice”).
113. Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court
Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 928 (1995).
114. Feld, supra note 99, at 69.
115. Id. at 118–21; see also Ainsworth, supra note 113, at 936 (“Given the increased procedural
formality and punitive sanctioning of the current juvenile court system, the traditional distinctions
between the juvenile and criminal justice systems no longer hold.”).
116. Feld, supra note 99, at 118.
117. Id. at 116–21.
118. Barry C. Feld, My Life in Crime: An Intellectual History of the Juvenile Court, 17 NEV. L.J.
299, 319 (2017).
119. Ainsworth, supra note 113, at 929.
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Following tough-on-crime era reforms, academics and advocates
sought to reduce the juvenile justice system’s use of incarceration without
challenging the juvenile court’s existence or its discretion. The National
Research Council Institute of Medicine, for instance, called on states to
“reduce the use of secure detention and secure confinement, by
developing community-based alternatives”—that is, incarcerate children
less frequently not by limiting discretion but by exercising it differently.120
While a small number of states did enact some limits on incarceration,121
more dramatic restrictions on that discretion and reforms to juvenile court
intake and disposition would not come until a new reform era began.
II.

STATE LEGISLATIVE REFORMS SINCE 2013

We are now in the midst of a new era of juvenile justice reform which
has begun to achieve long-standing calls to “us[e] sanction policies that
keep kids in communities and minimiz[e] secure confinement,” while
returning to the rehabilitative goals that were de-emphasized in the
tough-on-crime era.122 This is the “children are different” era, named for
a phrase from a line of Supreme Court Eighth Amendment cases requiring
consideration of youth as mitigation in sentencing,123 prohibiting capital
punishment,124 and sharply limiting life without the possibility of parole
sentences for children committing the most severe offenses.125 States have
also reversed some tough-on-crime era reforms, most prominently by
raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction and limiting waivers to
criminal court.126 These changes increased the proportion of cases subject
120. JUVENILE CRIME, supra note 101, at 224.
121. See infra notes 133–144 and accompanying text.
122. Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus, On Strategy and Tactics for Contemporary
Reforms, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 216, 216 (Franklin E. Zimring
& David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014).
123. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012).
124. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
125. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010).
126. The upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction is now seventeen in nearly every state. The
upper limit had been fifteen or sixteen in thirteen states in 1997, but that number has declined to four.
Jurisdictional
Boundaries,
JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT.,
http://www.jjgps.org/jurisdictional-boundaries [https://perma.cc/A4FB-K22C] (showing changes
from 1997–2018); 2019 Legislative Reforms After Raise the Age, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. (May
20, 2019), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/2019/item/2019-legislative-reforms-after-raisethe-age [https://perma.cc/2Y3E-MWRN] (noting several states which raised the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction and counting four states yet to do so). The Campaign for Youth Justice separately
discussed the trend of states making waiver—the process of a juvenile court waiving its jurisdiction
so the state may try and sentence a child in adult criminal court—more difficult. Marcy Mistrett, 15
Years of Impact: How We Won, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST., http://www.campaignforyouthjustice
.org/15-years-of-impact-how-we-won [https://perma.cc/9E8G-3TDF].
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to juvenile court rather than criminal court sentences. This era’s reforms
rest heavily on expanded neurological and psychological research which,
as the Supreme Court found, “reinforces the conventional wisdom that
adolescents are different from adults in ways that affect their criminal
conduct.”127 The Supreme Court has now repeatedly found that children
under eighteen are categorically less culpable than adults who commit the
same crimes because children are less mature, more impulsive, more
susceptible to negative familial and peer pressure, and more amenable
to rehabilitation.128
The reforms described in this Part build on a separate body of empirical
research that examines the impact of different juvenile justice legal system
interventions. That research includes a range of powerful findings that call
into question many juvenile justice system interventions. Much research
focuses on incarcerating children—the most dramatic intervention—
finding that incarceration often leads to more recidivism than communitybased alternatives,129 and that when judges do order incarceration, longer
periods of incarceration do not correlate with fewer repeat offenses.130
Research has also established harms from less invasive and more common
interventions. Probation, the most common outcome for children
convicted of a crime in juvenile court, is increasingly criticized for failing
to facilitate rehabilitation, especially when courts subject children to long
probationary sentences.131 Prosecuting children for relatively minor
offenses often leads to higher recidivism rates and other harms.132 Taken
together, these findings support efforts to reduce the use of incarceration
and its length, limit the length of probation sentences, and divert rather
than prosecute a greater proportion of cases. These efforts are the central
features of recent legislative reforms.
The reforms described in this Part build on more modest reforms from
earlier years. In 1994, Virginia limited commitments to the state juvenile
justice agency to children who were convicted of felonies or a second or
subsequent “[c]lass 1 misdemeanor.”133 But two class one misdemeanors
could lead to an indeterminate commitment, and that category included
common offenses such as simple assault and petit larceny.134 Moreover,
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 32 (emphasis in original).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
See infra notes 162–170 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 200–202 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 224–232 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 249–258 and accompanying text.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.8(A)(14) (2021).
Id. § 18.2-57(A) (simple assault); id. § 18.2-96(2) (petit larceny). Commitments, even for
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Virginia simultaneously expanded the range of cases covered by its
serious offender statute, and thus made it easier to incarcerate children.135
In 1998, North Carolina established a three-by-three grid of sentencing
options based on the severity of a child’s offense and the child’s offense
history.136 However, eight of the nine grid boxes permitted judges to send
children to some kind of state facility.137 Only children convicted of minor
offenses with “low” offense histories were spared incarceration.138 A
conviction of certain misdemeanors or multiple minor offenses would
create a higher offense history score139 and render the child eligible for
placement in a state facility.140 In 2007, California limited commitments
to state facilities to children convicted of certain specified offenses.141 But
judges could still commit these children to county-run facilities,142 and
this modest foray into offense-based sentencing was part of a broader
realignment from a state to a county-run system.143 Also in 2007, Texas
prohibited commitment of children to the state juvenile justice agency
unless they were convicted of a felony, although judges maintained the
ability to order children placed in “a suitable public or private [institution
or agency],” or other secure facilities.144
The results of these earlier and relatively modest reforms were, with
one exception, smaller in comparison to the results of 2010s reforms. In
Texas, while the number of children committed to state facilities declined
dramatically,145 the proportion of cases leading to some kind of

those misdemeanors, can last indefinitely up to three years, id. § 16.1-285, and up to seven years if
convicted of certain more serious offenses, id. § 16.1-285.1(C).
135. JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM’N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, THE OPERATION AND
IMPACT OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONS SERVICES IN VIRGINIA, S. DOC. NO. 19, GEN. ASSEMB., at 21
(1997), http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt195.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK86-FVG7].
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2508(f) (2019).
137. Children categorized in “level 3” could be committed to a training school. Id. § 7B-2508(e).
Children categorized in “level 2” could be placed in a “wilderness program.” Id. §§ 7B-2508(d),
7B-2506(13)–(23).
138. Id. § 7B-2507(b)–(c).
139. Id.
140. Id. § 7B-2508(f).
141. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731(a)(4) (West 2021).
142. Id. §§ 731(a), 730(a).
143. CAL. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM: REALIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES,
at i–ii (2008), https://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/resource_784.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LYK5-7AWZ].
144. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04(d)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii), (d)(2) (West 2021).
145. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., BENDING THE CURVE: JUVENILE CORRECTIONS REFORM IN
TEXAS 1 (2013) [hereinafter BENDING THE CURVE], https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uplo
adedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/psppbendingthecurvejuvenilecorrectionsreformintexaspdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/557W-7HAD].
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out-of-home placement increased, driven largely by an increase in the
proportion of cases leading to county placements.146 In fact, the drop in
state-level commitments was roughly made up by the increase in countylevel commitments, which also increased in duration.147 Similarly in
California, while a longer-term decline in state commitments occurred,
county placements increased, as did the number of children on
probation.148 Virginia’s package of reforms actually increased juvenile
prison populations due to longer length of stays for more serious
offenders.149 The most dramatic impact occurred in North Carolina, where
the commitment rate of children declined by more than half from 1998
to 2001.150
Since 2010, both the pace and scope of reform has increased. At least
eight states—Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia—have enacted wide-ranging juvenile
justice reforms which revolutionized juvenile court sentencing by
imposing offense-based limits on prosecutors’ power to prosecute cases
146. JENNIFER CARREON, ELIZABETH A. HENNEKE & JOHN J. KREAGER, TEX. CRIM. JUST. COAL.,
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: DEEPENING THE GAINS IN TEXAS JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 3 (2015),
https://www.texascjc.org/system/files/publications/TCJC%20Unfinished%20Business%20Policy%2
0Paper%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/49C5-RBJK]. Texas saw a 68.6% decline in state
commitments in the five years following its 2007 reforms attributed by researchers to the 2007
reforms, and not simply the ongoing decline in crime rates in that period or other factors. JOHN POSEY,
TEX. LEGIS. BUDGET BD., CHARACTERISTICS OF JUVENILES IN TEXAS JUVENILE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2007 REFORMS 1
(2013), https://www.lbb.state.tx.us/Documents/Publications/Issue_Briefs/604_Juveniles_in_TJJD_F
acilities_Before_Reforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE9J-H5QP]; TONY FABELO, NANCY ARRIGONA,
MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, AUSTIN CLEMENS & MINER P. MARCHBANKS III, COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS & PUB. POL’Y RSCH. INST., CLOSER TO HOME: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE AND LOCAL
IMPACT OF THE TEXAS JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORMS 30, 35 (2015), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/texas-JJ-reform-closer-to-home.pdf [https://perma.cc/TU2Z-MUUV]. But a
detailed empirical analysis of these reforms found that while state commitments declined
significantly, an increasing percentage of cases led to “county-based secure and non-secure residential
placements.” FABELO ET AL., supra, at 39.
147. FABELO ET AL., supra note 146, at 40–42. This reform was still impactful—county-level
commitments were still significantly shorter than state commitments, and other important benefits
from being housed locally than in a state institution possibly far from home, like facilitating greater
family visits while incarcerated and easing reintegration to the community upon release. Id. at 40.
148. BARRY KRISBERG, LINH VUONG, CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & SUSAN MARCHIONNA,
BERKELEY CTR. FOR CRIM. JUST., A NEW ERA IN CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE: DOWNSIZING THE
STATE YOUTH CORRECTIONS SYSTEM 6–7, 9–10 (2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/N
ew_Era.pdf [https://perma.cc/U645-3A7D]. Other analysts note that even when the rate of children
incarcerated at the county level declined, it did so at a lower rate than the juvenile felony arrest rate,
suggesting county facilities took an increasing share of incarcerated children. SONYA TAFOYA &
JOSEPH HAYES, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., JUST THE FACTS: JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
(2014), https://www.ppic.org/publication/juvenile-justice-in-california/ [https://perma.cc/6ZB6GTNF].
149. JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM’N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, supra note 135, at 26.
150. N.C. DEP’T OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2010).
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and judges’ power to impose relatively severe punishments.151 These
reforms reflect several common features. They limit prosecutors’
authority to prosecute (rather than divert) some cases and judges’
authority to incarcerate children at disposition following certain offenses.
They are informed by social science research showing relative harms to
the juvenile court’s rehabilitative mission based from these (now limited)
more punitive actions.152 The success of reforms so far, coupled with that
supporting research, and engagement from large foundations working to
facilitate reforms suggest that these reforms will continue to spread
around the nation.
A.

Offense-Based Limits on Commitments/Incarceration

As of this writing, eight states have enacted offense-based limits on
when or for how long judges can incarcerate children. These reforms
represent a dramatic break with juvenile justice law’s historic disposition
policies, both for putting offense-based upper limits on sentences and
constraining discretion held by judges.
These reforms evoke earlier failed reform proposals—the Institute of
Justice and American Bar Association’s (IJA-ABA) 1980
recommendations for “proportionate but lenient” offense-specific
juvenile justice sanctions.153 The IJA-ABA Commission sought to codify
“the principle of limited intervention,” following the notion that the less
restrictively the state intervenes, the better off the child and society.154
Reforming juvenile courts’ “relatively unlimited sanctioning authority”
was essential to ensure over-intervention did not occur.155 In that IJAABA proposal, all offenses would be placed into categories from most to
least severe; the most severe offenses could lead to no more than thirtysix months of incarceration or probation.156 The lowest level felony
category could lead to no more than six months’ incarceration or eighteen
months’ probation, and the two misdemeanor categories either prohibited
incarceration outright or limited it to more severe misdemeanors
committed by children with certain prior records.157 Those

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See infra sections II.A–C.
See infra notes 162–170, 200–202, 224–232, 249–258 and accompanying text.
REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 37.
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 40.
Id.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. The IJA and ABA reaffirmed this recommendation in a 1996 publication. INST. OF JUST.
ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH
152–53 (Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. ed., 1996).
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recommendations are offense-based—the adjudicated offense and prior
record are the primary criteria—but the severity of offense would direct
the upper limit of possible sanctions for both commitments to state
custody and probation.158 The proposal would thus limit the harshness of
any subsequent punishment, rather than use the severity of an offense to
transfer a child to criminal court or otherwise impose more punitive
punishments on them. The IJA-ABA thus sought to impose a childspecific form of proportionality—one that took specific offenses into
account, but still emphasized “lenience and a concern for the needs of
young offenders.”159
This approach—creating maximum, not minimum, sentences—
contrasted with tough-on-crime reforms enacted in the years after the
ABA’s recommendations and is discussed in section I.C.160 It also
contrasts with more punitive proposals from that era. For instance, the
American Legislative Exchange Council proposed a model juvenile
justice code that would impose strong presumptions in favor of
commitments to state custody whenever a child was convicted of a
felony.161 That proposal illustrates what a more punitive offense-specific
juvenile court sentencing reform would look like—mandatory minima
rather than maxima proposed by the ABA.
1.

Prohibitions on Incarcerating Children for Minor Offenses

A range of evidence demonstrates that incarcerating children leads to
worse outcomes than treating them in the community, especially for less
serious offenders.162 One leading study found that children who were
incarcerated had significantly less high school graduation rates and
significantly more incarceration rates for adult crimes than similar
children who were not.163 The researchers theorized that incarceration
158. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 37, 42.
159. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 37.
160. See sources cited supra notes 98–99. In addition to some mandatory minimum sentences in
juvenile court, expanded waiver statutes from the same era exposed more children to mandatory
minimum sentences in criminal court. See Feld, supra note 97, at 500–19 (describing expanded waiver
statutes from that era).
161. RALPH A. ROSSUM, BENEDICT J. KOLLER & CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM: A MODEL FOR THE STATES 45, 49 (1987), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/10
7460NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q98-GQWL].
162. See Clare Huntington & Elizabeth S. Scott, Conceptualizing Legal Childhood in the TwentyFirst Century, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1371, 1403–04 (2020) (summarizing research showing harms of
incarceration on central and how “modern justice system regulators increasingly have embraced the
lessons offered by this research”).
163. Anna Aizer & Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Juvenile Incarceration, Human Capital, and Future Crime:
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disrupts normal adolescent development and human capital accumulation,
leading to more crime over time.164 As other scholars have well
documented, multiple other studies provide evidence that incarceration
undermines the goal of crime prevention.165 In 2013, the NRC evaluated
several years of research into adolescent development and the juvenile
justice system and suggested a “developmental approach” to juvenile
justice policy questions.166 It described a “reevaluation of incarcerationbased correctional [approaches]” based on the high cost of secure
confinement and research showing high recidivism among children upon
release from incarceration, coupled with evidence showing that leaving
children at home with probation supervision and community-based
services can work effectively.167 It noted that limiting the rate at which
children reoffend can depend on the child’s “social setting,” especially
considering the particular impact peers have on children.168 The social
setting of institutional placements is often harmful, especially for less
severe offenders.169 The NRC also observed that community-based
interventions can help rehabilitate children, and “are in a better position
to promote contact with prosocial peers.”170 That is, community-based
interventions can prevent exposing children who commit minor offenses
to more serious offenders when states incarcerate children.
This research supports one of the most common reforms, present in six
states: statutory prohibitions on incarceration following conviction of
certain relatively minor offenses. Such reforms seek to prevent the harms
of unnecessary incarceration delineated in that research and what
happened in In re Gault—the incarceration of a child convicted only of a
low-level offense—a problem the Supreme Court did nothing about.171
Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 130 Q.J. ECON. 759, 763 (2015). The study examined
children on the margins of a decision to incarcerate—that is, children who some judges would
incarcerate but others would not. Id. at 762–63.
164. Id. at 800. The researchers measured human capital—intangible development of skills and
habits which contribute to quantifiable earnings—by school completion and adult recidivism. Id.
at 760.
165. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 172 (describing sum total of research); FELD, supra
note 22, at 149 (summarizing research findings regarding juvenile residential facilities). I do not
attempt to provide a comprehensive review of this research, as that task has already been undertaken
by, among others, the National Research Council’s thorough review of it. REFORMING JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 3–4. Rather, I seek to summarize the central findings of that research to
show what existing reforms have relied on and what future reforms could similarly rely on.
166. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 321–31.
167. Id. at 41–42.
168. Id. at 124.
169. Id. at 124, 126.
170. Id. at 125–26, 153.
171. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.
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Georgia began the trend towards offense-based limits on incarceration
when it enacted a comprehensive juvenile justice reform bill in 2013,
including prohibitions on judges incarcerating children who had only been
convicted of relatively minor offenses.172 The new disposition statute only
permits judges to send children to any kind of placement if they have been
convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor following at least four other prior
convictions, one of which was for a felony.173 That is, for most children
convicted of only misdemeanors, this reform prohibits judges from
incarcerating them.
Hawaii continued the trend in 2014, amending its disposition statute to
permit commitment to a state “youth correctional facility” only for
children convicted of felonies or probation violations.174 Less secure
placements in local or private agencies remain possible, but the most
severe sanction is now limited to those more serious offenders.
Kentucky, in 2014, enacted a similar prohibition on incarcerating
children convicted of the least severe offenses. Kentucky’s disposition
statute describes two forms of incarceration—short-term “secure
detention” of up to forty-five days (for fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds) or
ninety days (for sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds), or longer-term
commitments to the custody of the state Department of Juvenile Justice.175
The 2014 reforms prohibited either kind of incarceration for children
convicted of violations (the lowest level offense).176 And they prohibited
the second, more severe, form of incarceration for children convicted of
misdemeanors, or lower level felonies (class D in Kentucky’s parlance),
unless the child had three or more prior convictions or four or more
probation violation findings, or a weapons or sex offense.177
South Dakota, in 2015, similarly prohibited committing children to
state custody for more than ninety days unless the child was convicted of
a relatively serious offense or other evidence established that the child
“presents a significant risk of physical harm to another person.”178 The
172. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-601 (2016).
173. Id. § 15-11-601(a)(10)–(11), (b). The statute prohibits placements in facilities “for delinquent
children”; foster care or mental health placements are not prohibited. Id.
174. HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-48(1)(B)(i) (2020). Exceptions also exist for children sent to youth
correctional facilities from juvenile drug court or girls’ court. In all cases, judges had to specify in
writing what makes the child a “public safety risk warranting placement in the correctional
facility.” Id.
175. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.060(3)(a) (West 2021). The reforms also limited those lengths of
time based on the offense for which a child was convicted. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
176. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.060(3).
177. Id. § 635.060(4).
178. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8C-7(10)(b)(i) (2020). A separate provision permits family courts
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juvenile court also has to find that no viable alternative to incarceration
exists and that incarceration is the “least restrictive alternative”
available.179
Also in 2015, West Virginia enacted reforms which presumptively
prohibit judges from committing children following a first conviction for
nonviolent misdemeanors.180
In 2017, Utah enacted comprehensive juvenile justice reform which
featured significant offense-based limits on when judges could commit
children to the custody of the state juvenile justice agency.181 The reform
law prohibited any such commitments when children were convicted of
only minor offenses such as contempt of court or probation violations,
status offenses,182 or offenses deemed “infraction[s].”183 More broadly,
the reform law prohibited such commitments for children convicted of
only misdemeanors unless the offense involved a weapon or the child had
at least five prior convictions.184
In 2018, Tennessee enacted a set of reforms which presumptively
barred incarceration unless the child was convicted of a felony, or was
convicted of a misdemeanor and had at least two prior convictions from
separate incidents.185 Tennessee’s reforms provide juvenile court judges
with some discretion to incarcerate children beyond those categories if the
court found “by clear and convincing evidence that the child is in
imminent risk of danger to the child’s health or safety and needs specific
treatment . . . available only if the child is placed in [state] custody.”186
And, in such cases, the child may presumptively be incarcerated for only
six months.187 The previous statute had followed the wide discretion of
the original juvenile court by permitting juvenile court judges to impose
to incarcerate any child—regardless of the offense for which they were convicted—for up to nine
days. Id. § 26-8C-7(6).
179. Id. § 26-8C-7(10)(a)–(b).
180. W. VA. CODE § 49-4-714(b)(6) (2020). The presumption may be rebutted by “clear and
convincing evidence that there is a significant and likely risk of harm, as determined by a needs
assessment, to the juvenile, a family member or the public and that continued placement in the home
is contrary to the best interest of the juvenile. . . .” Id.
181. H.B. 239, 62d Leg., 2017 Gen. Sess. § 65 (Utah 2017).
182. Status offenses are not crimes, and are only offenses when done by a child. They include
truancy and allegations that a child is “ungovernable, habitually disobedient and beyond the control
of his parents.” State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 325 (W. Va. 1977).
183. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-117(2)(d)(i) (West 2020).
184. Id. § 78A-6-117(2)(c)(ii). The court must also find that “nonresidential treatment options have
been exhausted or nonresidential treatment options are not appropriate.” Id. § 78A-6-117(2)(c)(i).
185. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-131(a)(4)(B) (2021).
186. Id. § 37-1-131(a)(4)(B)(iii)(a) (emphasis added).
187. Id. § 37-1-131(a)(4)(B)(iii)(b). A six-month commitment may be extended for one additional
six-month term if the child continues to need treatment available only in custody. Id.
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whatever sentence they deemed “best suited to the child’s treatment,
rehabilitation and welfare.”188 While the exceptions in Tennessee’s reform
legislation maintain more judicial discretion at sentencing than in other
states,189 they still represent a significant step towards offense-based
limits and limits on judicial discretion.
Juvenile justice agency leaders in states which enacted these reforms
cited concerns about incarcerating children for relatively minor
offenses.190 This justification implies that these reforms seek to reverse
the increase in incarceration rates for minor offenses that emerged in the
tough-on-crime era,191 and apply the lessons of research showing harms
of incarceration.192 For instance, South Dakota’s juvenile justice agency
director reported that “one of the most compelling reasons we identified
for pursuing reform was that 7 in 10 kids in Department of Corrections
custody were there for probation violations, low-level misdemeanors, or
status offenses.”193 Hawaii’s juvenile justice agency director cited the
“large proportion of youth coming into the system on low-level
offenses.”194 Tennessee’s governor lobbied for reform to “[r]eserve
detention and out-of-home placement for youth who have committed
serious crimes or pose a public safety risk.”195 Other states which enacted
these reforms expressed concern about large numbers of children
incarcerated for relatively minor offenses prior to those reforms. In
Kentucky in 2012, 55% of incarcerated children had been incarcerated for

188. Id. § 37-1-131(a).
189. Media reports attributed those exceptions to arguments raised by judges in defense of their
discretion, and noted advocates’ consternation about those exceptions. See, e.g., Julie Warren,
Tennessee’s Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 Sets the Stage for Sweeping Reform in the Future,
RIGHT ON CRIME (May 7, 2018), https://www.rightoncrime.com/2018/05/tennessees-juvenile-justicereform-act-of-2018-sets-te-stae-for-sweeping-reform-in-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/LQ3F-MPJU];
Adam Tamburin, Advocates Once Praised Bill Haslam’s Juvenile Justice Bill. Now They Say It’s
Watered Down, TENNESSEAN (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2018/04/17/
tennessee-juvenile-justice-bill-haslam/520421002/ [https://perma.cc/TS4Q-5NRB].
190. Interviewing several of these leaders, the Pew Charitable Trust reported that “these leaders all
said reform was necessary because their states were sending high numbers of low-level, low-risk
youth to expensive out-of-home facilities and getting poor returns on those investments.” DANA
SHOENBERG, PEW CHARITABLE TRS., HOW STATE REFORM EFFORTS ARE TRANSFORMING
JUVENILE JUSTICE (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/
2019/11/26/how-state-reform-efforts-are-transforming-juvenile-justice [https://perma.cc/EUG74ESV].
191. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 162–170 and accompanying text.
193. SHOENBERG, supra note 190.
194. Id.
195. Reforming Tennessee’s Juvenile Justice System: Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, TENN.
OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR (2018), https://www.tn.gov/former-governor-haslam/2018-legislativepriorities/j ustice.html [https://perma.cc/S8FK-LG4E].
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misdemeanor offenses, probation violations—an increase since 2002.196
The high numbers of children incarcerated only for relatively minor
offenses was a direct result of the highly discretionary sentences permitted
since the juvenile court’s origins, which is the feature of juvenile law
directly targeted by these reforms.
Such concerns have also been voiced in at least one state that are
considering similar reforms. After the emergence of the COVID-19
pandemic in March 2020, the South Carolina juvenile justice agency
director wrote to judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement “seeking
cooperation from you as a partner in the juvenile justice system to strongly
consider only detaining and committing youth who are a current, serious
risk to public safety.”197 While immediately focused on reducing the
spread of the disease in juvenile jails and group homes, the request reflects
a concern about authorities incarcerating children who are not “current,
serious risk[s] to public safety.”198 Perhaps not coincidentally, legislation
to impose offense-based limits on intake, pre-trial detention, and
disposition authority was endorsed by a South Carolina Senate Select
Committee and was pending before the State Senate Judiciary Committee
when the coronavirus suspended most legislative action.199
2.

Limits on the Length of Incarceration

Research also demonstrates that incarcerating children—even those
who have committed more serious offenses—for more than a small
number of months serves no significant public safety benefit.200 The
196. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., KENTUCKY’S 2014 JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 3–4
(2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/07/psppkyjuvenilejusticereformbriefjuly201
4.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV3R-N7V7].
197. Letter from Freddie B. Pough, Exec. Dir., S.C. Dep’t of Juv. Just., to S.C. Fam. Ct. Js., S.C.
Sheriffs & Chiefs of Police, S.C. Solics. & S.C. Pub. Defs. (Mar. 17, 2020) (on file with author); see
also Letter from Freddie B. Pough, Exec. Dir., S.C. Dep’t of Juv. Just., to S.C. Fam. Ct. Js., S.C.
Sheriffs & Chiefs of Police, S.C. Solics. & S.C. Pub. Defs. (July 20, 2020) [hereinafter July 20, 2020
Letter from Freddie B. Pough to S.C. Fam. Ct. Js.] (on file with author) (noting youth detained for
“non-violent, misdemeanor, and status level offenses”). It is difficult to analyze what impact this
request had; public data for 2020 has not yet been released and any analysis would have to distinguish
the impact of the pandemic from the director’s request.
198. July 20, 2020 Letter from Freddie B. Pough to S.C. Fam. Ct. Js., supra note 197.
199. S. 1018, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., 123d Sess. (S.C. 2020); S.C. SENATE SELECT COMM.,
SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON RAISE THE AGE REPORT TO THE SENATE 11–42
(2020), https://www.scstatehouse.gov/CommitteeInfo/RaiseTheAgeSelectCommittee/S.C.%20Senat
e%20Select%20Committee%20on%20Raise%20the%20Age%20Report%20to%20the%20Senate.p
df [https://perma.cc/95QK-NQRZ]. The bill was introduced and, as of this writing, remains pending
in the 2021–2022 legislative session. S. 53, 2020–2021 Gen. Assemb., 124th Sess. (S.C. 2021).
200. Thomas A. Loughran, Edward P. Mulvey, Carol A. Schubert, Jeffrey Fagan, Alex R. Piquero
& Sandra H. Losoya, Estimating a Dose-Response Relationship Between Length of Stay and Future
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“Pathways to Desistance” study, a longitudinal analysis of more than
1,300 children sentenced in two large metropolitan areas, examined the
impact of different lengths of incarceration of serious juvenile offenders
on future rates of recidivism.201 Crucially, once a child had been
incarcerated for three months, the researchers could detect “no marginal
benefit” to public safety for keeping children “in institutional care for
longer periods of time.”202 Applying this research assumes a rehabilitative
goal; incarceration should be limited in time because it serves no further
purpose in helping children avoid future offenses, while a more punitive
orientation would justify longer incarceration on retributive grounds.
Consistent with that research and a rehabilitative goal, three states’
2010s reforms imposed upper limits on the length of time a child can be
incarcerated under a juvenile court sentence based on the specific offense
or offenses for which a child is convicted. These limits look quite similar
to the 1980 IJA-ABA proposal; if anything, the enacted time limits on
incarceration are shorter than those proposed by the ABA four
decades ago.
Kentucky’s 2014 reform imposed upper limits on the lengths of
commitments to the state Department of Juvenile Justice: for
misdemeanors (which could only lead to commitments if the child had
multiple convictions, multiple probation violations, or a weapons or sex
offense conviction), commitments could not exceed twelve months; and
for low level felonies, commitments could not exceed eighteen months.203
Kansas’s 2017 juvenile justice reform limited the maximum length of
time children could be incarcerated through a different mechanism.
Kansas calculates minimum and maximum juvenile sentencing ranges
based on the severity of offenses, which its statute places into several
categories.204 That state’s 2017 reforms shifted some offenses to less
severe categories and reducing the maximum lengths for most categories.
Recidivism in Serious Juvenile Offenders, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 699, 720 (2009). Foundations supporting
reforms trumpeted this finding. E.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRS., UTAH’S 2017 JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM SHOWS EARLY PROMISE 9 (2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/issue-briefs/2019/05/utahs-2017-juvenile-justice-reform-shows-early-promise
[https://perma.cc/6AB6-MAYS].
201. Loughran et al., supra note 200, at 707.
202. Id. at 726. The researchers identified “somewhat of an effect for staying longer than 3
months,” but noted that the sample size of such short stays was “too small to provide adequate
statistical power with which to draw sound inferences.” Id. That small sample size itself illustrates
how longer sentences were the norm for children committed to custody. The study also found a slight
(though not statistically significant) increase in recidivism rates for children deemed serious offenders
who were incarcerated compared with those placed on probation. Id. at 722–23.
203. 2014 Ky. Acts Ch.132 § 47(codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.060(4)(b)(1)–(2)
(West 2021)).
204. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2369 (2021).
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“Serious offender II” level offenses shifted from eighteen to thirty-six
month sentencing ranges to nine to eighteen months, and “serious
offender III” shifted from nine to eighteen months to six to twelve.205
Utah’s 2017 reform imposes perhaps the most dramatic limits on the
length of time children can be incarcerated, creating limits significantly
shorter than the IJA-ABA limits proposed in 1980. Utah’s legislature
created a presumptive maximum of six months, unless the child re-offends
in that time or more time is necessary to complete a specific treatment
program.206 This limit is based on the offense for which a child is
convicted—that six-month limit only applies to children convicted of
relatively low or moderate severity offenses, while convictions like
murder, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and felonies
involving the use of a weapon are not subject to that limit.207
3.

Results: Reduced Number of Incarcerated Children

Throughout the “children are different” reform era, the total number of
children convicted in juvenile court and then sent to an out-of-home
placement has declined nationally, from about 150,800 in 2005 to 62,100
in 2018, a 59% decrease.208 The percentage of adjudicated cases leading
to out-of-home placement, however, has remained very stable over those
years, hovering between 26% and 28%.209 That stability suggests that the
reduced numbers of incarcerated children results from reduced numbers
of cases reaching disposition, rather than reductions in the proportion of
cases in which judges order children incarcerated.
The states210 engaging in these reforms saw dramatic impacts in the
years after enacting this reform legislation with more dramatic results than
more modest reform legislation from earlier years had caused. In Kansas,
the number of children in any kind of residential confinement declined
63% in four years, from 2015 (when it adopted its reforms) through
2018.211 Hawaii’s number of children incarcerated in a secure facility

205.
206.
207.
208.

2016 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 46 § 46 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2369(a)(2)).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-7-404(3) (West 2017).
Id. § 62A-7-404(5).
OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUVENILE COURT
STATISTICS 2018, 46 (2020) [hereinafter JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2018], https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/
sites/g/files/xyckuh176/files/media/document/juvenile-court-statistics-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LDH9-B95C].
209. Id.
210. Tennessee’s reforms took effect July 1, 2019. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-101(a) (2021). I omit
Tennessee from this paragraph’s summary of reform legislation’s impact due to the relatively short
time it has been in effect and the relative lack of data to examine.
211. SHOENBERG, supra note 190.
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declined 66% from 2013 to 2018.212 Kentucky’s number of children
sentenced to a juvenile justice agency facility declined by about one-third
from the three years before its reform to the five years following,213
compared with a more modest national decline in those years.214 In
particular, the proportion of Kentucky children committed to agency
custody based on misdemeanors, probation violations, or status offenses
rather than felony convictions declined from 53 to 24%—showing the
effect of the offense-specific sentencing reforms.215 In Georgia, from 2012
to 2017, the number of children committed to “regional youth detention
centers” dropped 58%, with a 21% drop occurring between 2013 (when
its reforms were enacted) and 2014.216 The number of Georgia children
housed at “youth development campuses” declined by 35%, with most of
that drop occurring after 2014.217 South Dakota’s number of juvenile
commitments declined 51% from 2014 (the year before its reforms) to
2016 (the year after)218 and the total number of children in state custody
declined by 54% by 2017.219 In Utah, the average daily population of
children in “secure care” facilities declined 22% from 2015 to 2019, 220

212. Id.
213. Sarah Vidal, Ben Adams, Megan Foster, LaShana Harris & Rachel Bingham, Presentation on
Juvenile Justice Reforms in Kentucky: Evaluation Findings and Lessons Learned 36–37 (Sept. 24,
2020) (on file with author); see also Jake Horowitz & Casey Pheiffer, Juvenile Justice Reforms Yield
Major
Advances
in
Kentucky,
PEW
CHARITABLE
TRS.
(May
3,
2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/05/03/juvenile-justice-reformsyield-major-advances-in-kentucky [https://perma.cc/2HXL-VU5N] (reporting trend from 2014–
2017); KY. DEP’T JUV. JUST., ANNUAL REPORT 2018, 11 (2019), https://djj.ky.gov/Annual%
20Reports/Annual%20Report%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJA9-Q3Y4] (same).
214. JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2018, supra note 208, at 46.
215. Horowitz & Pheiffer, supra note 213.
216. Data is calculated from two sources. GA. DEP’T OF JUV. JUST., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 10, 13
(2017), http://online.pubhtml5.com/howr/sakl/#p=1 [https://perma.cc/LU8Q-LM2S]; GA. DEP’T OF
JUV. JUST., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2018) [hereinafter 2017 ANNUAL REPORT],
http://online.pubhtml5.com/howr/ghqy/#p=1 [https://perma.cc/RY95-BSFN].
217. 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 216, at 16.
218. S.D. JUV. JUST. REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, JUVENILE JUSTICE PUBLIC
SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2017) [hereinafter 2016 ANNUAL REPORT],
https://boardsandcommissions.sd.gov/bcuploads/PublicDocs/JJPSIA%202016%20Annual%20Repo
rt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCZ5-4UVA].
219. Katelyn Tye-Skowronski, More Support, Better Outcomes: South Dakota, Kansas Have
Revamped Their Juvenile Justice Systems in Recent Years, and Some Early Results Are Promising,
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS: KNOWLEDGE CTR. (Mar. 26, 2018, 12:00 AM),
https://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/more-support-better-outcomes-south-dakota-kansashave-revamped-their-juvenile-justice [https://perma.cc/VZ4P-WKV5].
220. JUV. JUST. OVERSIGHT COMM., UTAH COMM’N ON CRIM. & JUV. JUST., Secure Care, in
ANNUAL REPORT 2019, https://justice.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/FY_2019_HB_239_Annua
l_Report.html#secure-care [https://perma.cc/CYF8-EE9B].
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and less secure “community placements” declined 54%.221 West Virginia
also recorded a decrease in admissions to secure facilities and an increase
in the proportion of cases referred to “non-residential programs,” although
the effect appears more modest than in other states.222 These declines were
large enough that four of these states were able to close at least one secure
juvenile facility.223
B.

Offense-Based Limits on Probation Lengths

Probation is the most common224—and increasingly criticized—
outcome for children found guilty in juvenile court. Foundations and
advocates do not mince words in describing probation as currently
practiced: the Annie E. Casey Foundation, a large foundation with a focus
on juvenile justice reform,225 writes that juvenile “probation . . . remains
deeply flawed both in concept and execution.”226 More specifically,
probation in practice seeks to enforce compliance with a set of conditions,
which becomes an exercise in bureaucratic box-checking for children who
succeed on probation, and a gateway to confinement for children who do
not comply with probation conditions yet do not pose a significant public
safety risk. One leading foundation compiled various studies showing that
probation supervision does not successfully prevent re-offending,
especially when compared to diversion programs.227 The National Council
of Juvenile and Family Court Judges adopted a resolution in 2017 calling
for dramatic changes to probation practice to make probation practice
“conform to the latest knowledge of adolescent development and
221. JUV. JUST. OVERSIGHT COMM., UTAH COMM’N ON CRIM. & JUV. JUST., Community
Placement, in ANNUAL REPORT 2019, https://justice.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/FY_2019_HB_
239_Annual_Report.html#community-placement [https://perma.cc/ TW3S-GVUW]. This placement
decline is measured in the rate per 1000 youths, which declined from 2.6 to 1.2. Id. That decline began
prior to the enactment of reform in Utah, but also had a particularly large drop from 2017 to 2018,
after reform took effect. Id.
222. CRIME & JUST. INST., CMTY. RES. FOR JUST., IMPLEMENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
CHANGE IN WEST VIRGINIA 3–4 (2019), http://www.crj.org/assets/2019/03/WV-2019-ImplementingJJ-System-Change-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/43C9-YRR9].
223. JULIA DURNAN, ROBIN OLSEN & SAMANTHA HARVELL, URB. INST., STATE-LED JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS AND EARLY OUTCOMES 9 (2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98321/state-led_juvenile_justice_systems_
improvement_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8UZ-FQW9].
224. JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2018, supra note 208, at 60.
225. See Juvenile Justice, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., https://www.aecf.org/work/juvenile-justice/
[https://perma.cc/BYB8-SETM] (describing the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s juvenile justice work).
226. THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., TRANSFORMING JUVENILE PROBATION: A VISION FOR
GETTING IT RIGHT 3 (2018), https://www.aecf.org/resources/transforming-juvenile-probation/
[https://perma.cc/4MZG-WVJK].
227. Id. at 6, 8.
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adolescent brain science.”228 These included the development of
individualized case plans between families and probation or juvenile
justice departments (terminology varies by state) rather than imposition
of probation conditions by judges.229
The latest social science knowledge shows why traditional probation—
in which children are required to abide by a set of conditions and face
sanctions if they fail to do so—often does not work.
Given their still-developing executive functioning skills, youth
can face tremendous difficulty engaging in the logical decision
making required to consistently adhere to probation conditions,
foregoing impulses for immediate gratification on a daily basis
over a long time period, and making consistently rational
decisions, particularly when faced with social or emotional
situations that may feel overwhelming . . . .230
Coupled with adolescents’ reduced ability to consider long-term future
consequences, and increased susceptibility to peer influences, violations
of any lengthy list of conditions should be expected.231 Children engaged
in common adolescent misbehavior are exposed to incarceration when
probation conditions prohibit a single unexcused absence or disciplinary
referral at school or a single failed drug test.232
Overly long probation periods exacerbate all of these concerns. The
longer a child remains on probation, the more opportunities for relatively
minor violations to turn into major legal issues. The Annie E. Casey
Foundation recommended against “unnecessarily long periods of
probation supervision,” and pointed to probation lengths measured in
years as too long.233 The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges called for probation to focus on “short-term, positive outcomes for
probation compliant behaviors.”234
Following these criticisms, at least three states have also enacted
offense-based limits on the length of time juvenile courts can keep
228. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, RESOLUTION REGARDING JUVENILE
PROBATION AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 2 (2017), https://www.ncjfcj.org/wp-content/uploads
/2019/08/regarding-juvenile-probation-and-adolescent-development.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4XEFSTU].
229. Id.
230. Naomi E. S. Goldstein, Elizabeth Gale-Bentz, Jeanne McPhee, Amanda NeMoyer, Sarah
Walker, Steve Bishop, Mark Soler, Jason Szanyi & Robert G. Schwartz, Applying the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges’ Resolution to Juvenile Probation Reform, 5
TRANSLATIONAL ISSUES PSYCH. SCI. 170, 173 (2019).
231. See THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 226, at 3.
232. Id. at 9.
233. Id. at 17.
234. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, supra note 228, at 2 (emphasis added).
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children on probation.235 In 2014, Kentucky legislation provided that
courts could impose up to thirty days probation for violations, six months
for misdemeanors (with certain exceptions for weapons or sex offenses),
twelve months for class D felonies, and any length up to age eighteen for
more serious felonies.236 For the two less serious categories, courts could
order longer probation only if more time is necessary to complete a
specific treatment program, and still subject to offense-specific limits
(three months and twelve months, respectively).237
In 2015, South Dakota imposed presumptive limits on the length of
probation—four months for most cases, and eight months if placed in “the
intensive juvenile probation program.”238 The South Dakota legislature
has since relaxed these limits somewhat—probation is now capped at six
months in most cases, and twelve months in “intensive” cases.239
Probation could be extended only if necessary to complete some evidencebased treatment or complete some other treatment program approved by
the court, and may not exceed eighteen months except in rare cases.240
These maximum limits represent a sharp departure from pre-legislation
practice. The Pew Charitable Trusts reported that two years before the
reforms, in 2013, probation lasted an average of 22.2 months.241
Moreover, probation lengths had “wide variation across” the state.242
South Dakota juvenile justice system leaders noted this justice-bygeography problem as one reason for that state’s probation reforms,
suggesting more uniform standards for determining probation lengths
could reduce geographic disparities and provide a more equal system
across the state.243
235. A more dramatic proposal in California would presumptively limit any juvenile probationary
period to six months, regardless of offense. Assemb. B. 503, 2021 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB503
[https://perma.cc/FR7K-MPQM]; Jeremy Loudenback, California Weighs Plan to Shrink Probation
Supervision Terms for Youth, IMPRINT (Apr. 6, 2021, 7:00 PM), https://imprintnews.org/justice/juve
nile-justice-2/california-weighs-plan-to-shrink-probation-supervision-terms-for-youth/53197
[https://perma.cc/EZG8-JYEU].
236. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.060(2)(c)(1)–(4) (West 2021).
237. Id. § 635.060(2)(c)(1)–(2).
238. S.B. 73, 2015 Leg., 90th Sess. (S.D. 2015).
239. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8C-14 (2020).
240. Id.
241. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., SOUTH DAKOTA’S 2015 JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 6 (2016),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/01/south-dakotas-2015-juvenilejustice-reform [https://perma.cc/TK54-MBBP].
242. Id.
243. In particular, South Dakota’s juvenile justice agency director raised the concern that the
availability of diversion programs and alternatives to incarceration depended on program availability
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Kansas enacted similar reforms in 2017, creating presumptive maxima
for the length of probation, based on the severity of a child’s offense and
a risk assessment. Those limits range from six months for children
convicted of misdemeanors and deemed low or moderate risk and felonies
but deemed low risk, to twelve months for children convicted of felonies
and deemed high risk, with total court supervision time capped at twelve
to eighteen months (depending on severity of the offense and risk
assessment scores).244 As in South Dakota, probation extensions are
permitted in only limited circumstances, and subject to hard caps of one,
three, or six months (depending on a child’s risk assessment).245 A fourth
state, Tennessee, imposed time limits on probation in 2018,246 but without
tying the limits to specific offense; probation could be imposed for only
six months, subject to extensions in six-month increments.247
The impact of these reforms is not yet clear. Agencies have lacked
adequate data to evaluate how probation caseloads or duration has
changed.248 Understanding the impact of reforms to probationary statutes
on the length of probation sentences is challenging. The average length of
probation is not an adequate measure because other elements of reform
change the composition of probation dockets. A state that diverts more
children facing low-level charges will leave a collection of children with
somewhat more severe charges or offense histories facing prosecution and
ending up on probation. Similarly, a state that, post-reform, places
children on probation who previously would have been incarcerated has
also changed the pool of children on probation. Accordingly, analyzing
the impact of reforms to the length of probation requires sophisticated
statistical analysis to compare probation lengths in similar cases before
and after reforms. I have been unable to find any such studies in the
relevant states. This is an area in which further empirical research could
be particularly useful.

in certain areas. The director also cites limits on probation lengths as “address[ing] the inconsistencies
we had in our supervision terms across the state.” SHOENBERG, supra note 190, at 3.
244. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2391(b), (g) (2021). The most severe offenses are exempted from these
time limits. Id. § 38-2391(c). When a child is convicted of multiple offense, the most severe offense
governs probation length and multiple probation orders may not run concurrently. Id. § 38-2391(d).
245. Id. § 38-2391(f), (g)(2).
246. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-131(a)(4)(B) (2020).
247. Id. § 37-1-131(a)(2)(A)(ii)(a).
248. E.g., KAN. LEGIS. DIV. OF POST AUDIT, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORMS: EVALUATING THE
EFFECTS OF SENATE BILL 367, at 4 (2020), https://www.kslpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/B01
.02-Final-Report-PDF_A.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGD4-7JTR].
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Offense-Specific Reforms Limiting Discretion to Prosecute

A body of empirical scholarship concludes that children’s involvement
in the juvenile justice system leads to more crime, creating a strong policy
incentive to keep such involvement to a minimum by prosecuting children
less frequently. Professors Tom Tyler and Rick Trinkner argue that “the
best solution for most juvenile offenders is to divert them out of the
juvenile justice system and focus upon rehabilitation, not criminalization,
and punishment.”249 Most children will simply age out of offending, and
justice system involvement, especially its most severe forms, can disrupt
normal maturation processes.250 A 2009 study concluded that greater
juvenile justice system involvement dramatically increased the likelihood
of children obtaining adult criminal records, with more intense
interventions leading to worse outcomes.251 The National Research
Council of the National Academies and Committee on Assessing Juvenile
Justice Reform more cautiously noted a “small” benefit of diverting rather
than prosecuting children.252 A 2013 meta-analysis found that diversion
was “significantly more effective than [prosecution in] the criminal justice
system in reducing recidivism.”253 Though the scope of results varied
based on the specific diversion program, results showed empirical support
for diversion programs generally.254
Other studies have yielded similar results. A longitudinal review of
children in South Carolina’s juvenile justice system found that unless a
child was diagnosed with an aggression-related mental health condition,
prosecuting (rather than dismissing or diverting) a child’s case increased
the likelihood of recidivism for all children, especially first-time offenders
249. TOM R. TYLER & RICK TRINKNER, WHY CHILDREN FOLLOW RULES: LEGAL SOCIALIZATION
121 (2018).
250. Id. at 121, 185 (“[C]ontact with the system has counterdevelopmental consequences and
interferes with a natural maturation process that overwhelmingly yields desirable outcomes.”).
251. Uberto Gatti, Richard E. Tremblay & Frank Vitaro, Iatrogenic Effect of Juvenile Justice, 50
J. CHILD PSYCH. & PSYCHIATRY 991, 996 (2009). While the authors could not statistically prove
causation, they concluded “that intervention by the justice system during adolescence has an overall
iatrogenic effect on youth.” Id.
252. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 150; see also id. at 169 (noting several
diversion programs that “have benefits that substantially exceed costs”).
253. Holly A. Wilson & Robert D. Hoge, The Effect of Youth Diversion Programs on Recidivism:
A Meta-Analytic Review, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 497, 512 (2013).
254. Id. For instance, diversion programs were found generally more effective for children
considered to be at medium or high risk of reoffending (perhaps because greater room for impact
exists for this population). Id. at 511–12. Some studies have suggested that “skill-building
interventions” such as cognitive-behavioral therapy and some academic interventions were “more
effective in a diversion setting than when offered through probation/parole or in custody.” Id. at 512.
The authors called for future evaluations of diversion programs to consider the specific types of
services provided in more detail than past studies available for their meta-analysis. Id. at 513.
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGITIMACY
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and less serious offenses.255 A 2019 study found that children offered
diversion accessed more mental health services than children prosecuted
and placed on probation who had similar levels of mental health needs,256
a finding which may help explain how diversion leads to more
rehabilitation.
The harms associated with overly punitive responses extend beyond the
criminal and juvenile justice systems. Various studies have demonstrated
that prosecuting rather than diverting or dismissing cases leads to reduced
high school completion rates and poorer educational outcomes in youth.257
These harms have cascading effects over a child’s transition to adulthood
and can lead to greater involvement in the adult justice system. The
collateral consequences associated with juvenile prosecution, such as
stigmatizing legal records, increase a child’s risk for negative social
outcomes broadly.258
This research is consistent with a body of sociological observations
about the justice system’s operation regarding individuals accused of lowlevel offenses. Describing the misdemeanor dockets of adult criminal
systems, where courts impose probationary sentences on most defendants,
two generations of scholars have concluded that “the process itself is the
punishment.”259 Applied to juvenile courts, research showing the relative
harms of prosecution over diversion demonstrate that the punishment of
bringing a child through the juvenile court process—even if the ultimate
court-imposed disposition will likely not include incarceration—is
punitive and often runs contrary to the juvenile justice system’s
rehabilitative goals.
Foundations that work closely with state agencies have relied on this
body of work to advocate for an expansion of diversion programs. The
Annie E. Casey Foundation describes the tough-on-crime era decrease in
the rate of cases diverted as “a conspicuous current-day failure of our
nation’s juvenile justice systems.”260 The Foundation recommends that

255. David E. Barrett & Antonis Katsiyannis, The Clemson Juvenile Delinquency Project: Major
Findings from a Multi-Agency Study, 26 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 2050, 2051–52 (2017).
256. Elizabeth Janopaul-Naylor, Samantha L. Morin, Brian Mullin, Esther Lee & James G. Barrett,
Promising Approaches to Police–Mental Health Partnerships to Improve Service Utilization for AtRisk Youth, 5 TRANSLATIONAL ISSUES PSYCH. SCI. 206, 206, 212 (2019).
257. David S. Kirk & Robert J. Sampson, Juvenile Arrest and Collateral Educational Damage in
the Transition to Adulthood, 86 SOCIO. EDUC. 36, 54–55 (2013); Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate?
Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462, 477 (2006).
258. Kirk & Sampson, supra note 257, at 54.
259. ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL
IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 65 (2018) (quoting MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS
IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 30 (1979)).
260. THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 226, at 23.
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about 60% of all cases be diverted (compared to 43% in recent data), 261
that authorities define categories of cases in which children should be
“[a]lways diverted,” and set factors for determining when less clear cases
should be diverted.262 Reforms limiting prosecutors’ ability to prosecute
certain charges are consistent with this practice, establishing sets of cases
which always or presumptively must be diverted.
Following this body of research and advocacy, at least four states
(Utah, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Kentucky) have imposed
offense-based reforms limiting the authority of prosecutors to prosecute
low-level offenses. These reforms either presumptively favor or require
options other than prosecuting children for some misdemeanors, many
minor school-based offenses, and status offenses. These options are
typically referred to as diversion—a path that avoids court processing (and
thus prosecution and commitment) so long as the child agrees to
participate in some kind of program intended to prevent re-offending.
While the details of these programs vary, they frequently include some
kind of educational, mental health, family, or substance abuse intervention
intended to help the child avoid re-offending.263
In 2017, Utah struck statutory language which granted authorities wide
discretion to determine if “the interests of the public or of the minor
require” prosecution.264 Utah replaced that language with a requirement
that they divert children accused only of misdemeanors or status offenses
unless the child has three prior convictions, has had “no more than three
prior unsuccessful nonjudicial adjustment attempts,”265 was deemed to be
of elevated risk on a risk assessment, or if the child faced certain relatively
serious charges or had a more serious record.266 This reform is notable
both for providing for diversion in a relatively wide range of cases and in
making diversion mandatory—the state “shall offer the minor one
nonjudicial adjustment”267—and for making diversion in eligible cases
mandatory. Prosecutors’ discretion is limited to cases which do not meet
criteria for mandatory diversion.268 The Utah legislation went further,
striking mechanisms to bring certain children before juvenile court at all

261. Id. at 13, 20.
262. Id. at 25.
263. Diversion Programs, supra note 4.
264. H.B. 239, 2017 Leg., Gen. Sess., 2017 Utah Laws Ch. 330 (striking portions of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78A-6-602 (West 2020)).
265. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-602(7)(a)(iii) (West 2021).
266. Id. § 78A-6-602(7).
267. Id. § 78A-6-602(4) (emphasis added).
268. Id. § 78A-6-602(b)(i).
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when accused of only minor offenses, including truancy269 and any
infraction or low-level misdemeanor (in Utah’s categorization) which
allegedly occurred at school.270
South Dakota enacted a more modest offense-based intake statute in
2015, establishing a presumption of diversion for children who have no
prior convictions, have no diversions within the last twelve months, and
only face charges of a non-violent misdemeanor.271 Discretion to
prosecute remains: prosecutors who have “good cause to believe that
[diversion] is insufficient to meet the purposes of this chapter” may still
charge children so long as they provide notice as to why they did so.272 A
child defendant may challenge such a decision to prosecute, requiring a
judge to rule on whether the child should be prosecuted.273
West Virginia, also acting in 2015, made diversion mandatory for all
status offenses274 unless children had prior adjudications or posed “a
significant and likely risk of harm” to themselves or others.275 West
Virginia also added a provision requiring prosecutors to determine if
nonviolent misdemeanor charges could be diverted—maintaining
prosecutors’ discretion over those charges, but nudging them to consider
diversion.276 West Virginia removed prosecutors’ discretion to determine
whether to prosecute children who failed to comply with all elements of a
diversion agreement, shifting that authority to a multidisciplinary team.277
Finally, Kentucky prohibited prosecutors from filing a petition for firsttime misdemeanor charges.278 In addition, Kentucky explicitly permitted
269. H.B. 239, 2017 Leg., Gen. Sess., 2017 Utah Laws Ch. 330, § 7 (striking portions of truancy
code, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-101.7, related to “habitual truants”). The Utah statute has been
subsequently renumbered, and the current statute reads as amended in 2017. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G6-203.
270. Id. § 53G-8-211(3)(a).
271. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-11.1 (2020).
272. Id.
273. Id. As of May 18, 2020, a Westlaw search reported no cases citing the statute.
274. Status offenses are not crimes, and are only offenses when done by a child. They include
truancy and allegations that a child is “ungovernable, habitually disobedient and beyond the control
of his parents.” State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 325 (W. Va. 1977).
275. Act of May 17, 2015, ch. 150, 2015 W. Va. Acts 1620 (codified as amended at W. VA. CODE
§ 49-4-702(b)(3)(B) (2020)).
276. W. VA. CODE § 49-4-702(c).
277. Id. § 49-4-702(e)–(f). Multidisciplinary team members can include caseworkers, a service
provider, a school staff member, and a family member. Id. § 49-4-702(f)(2).
278. Act of Apr. 25, 2014, ch. 132, § 45(4), 2014 Ky. Acts 860 (codified as amended at KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 635.010(4) (West 2021)). In addition, Kentucky enacted a range of other provisions not
tied to specific offenses to expand diversion. In particular, Kentucky created an “enhanced pre-court
diversion process.” PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 196, at 7; Act of Apr. 25, 2014, ch. 132,
§ 26(1), 2014 Ky. Acts 845 (codified as amended at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.035) (describing
“family accountability, intervention, and response team[s]”).
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any party to file a motion in any case, regardless of charge, asking a judge
to order a diversion program in place of prosecution.279
These reforms have led to dramatic increases in the proportion of cases
diverted rather than prosecuted.280 In Utah, diverted cases increased from
roughly one quarter of pre-reform cases to more than one-half in 2018,
the first full year after legislation was in effect.281 In South Dakota, the
number of reported diversion cases has increased by about one-third from
2016 to 2019.282 In Kentucky, the proportion of cases leading to diversion
increased from 40% pre-reform to 60% post,283 and this coincided with
reduced likelihood that children would be charged with a
subsequent offense.284
D.

The Beginning of a Wave?

The reforms described in sections II.A–II.C are important in their own
right, but also because they may indicate a growing wave of reforms
across the nation and the intellectual underpinnings of those reforms.
Indeed, the geographic, demographic, and political diversity of the states
surveyed above suggests the possibility that these reforms could spread
further around the country.
Another feature of these reforms which may help them spread to other
states is the role of a range of foundations in advocating for these reforms.
That role reflects a consensus among an influential set of foundations,
think tanks, and researchers of the value of these offense-based
prosecution and sentencing limitations. It also reflects a growing
consensus about related reform topics—such as limiting pre-trial
279. Act of Apr. 25, 2014, ch. 132, § 33, 2014 Ky. Acts 850 (codified as amended at KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 610.105).
280. I have been unable to obtain data from West Virginia. This paragraph discusses data from
other states enacting reforms limiting intake authority.
281. Diversions accounted for 28%, 17%, and 22% of all cases in the three years immediately
preceding reforms, then increased to 55% in the year immediately after reforms took effect. PEW
CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 200, at 15–16.
282. A 2019 report counts 1,930 diversion cases compared to 1,415 in 2016, a 36% increase. S.D.
JUV. JUST. PUB. SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, FY 19 APPENDICES 3 (2019)
[hereinafter FY 2019 APPENDICES], https://boardsandcommissions.sd.gov/bcuploads/PublicDocs/A
ppendix%202019%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/S79F-3HK3]. South Dakota data does not include
every county, and the counties reporting vary from one year to another, making precise comparisons
difficult. Compare id. at 2, with 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 218, at 22–23. The counties
present in one year but not in another report relatively small numbers of diversion cases that would
not impact the overall trend lines. The largest county—Pennington (Rapid City)—reported an
increase from 595 diversion cases in 2016 to 991 in 2019, accounting for most of the statewide change.
Compare 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 218, at 23, with FY 19 APPENDICES, supra, at 2.
283. Vidal et al., supra note 213, at 33–34.
284. Id. at 35–36.
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detention285—which could play a role in any future reform efforts in these
or other states. The most prominent player has been the Pew Charitable
Trusts, whose website touts its work in most of the states discussed
above.286 Consulting work from other foundations, such as the Annie E.
Casey Foundation, also contributed to some of those reforms.287 Pew’s
reports frequently cite the empirical research discussed in this section,
pointing, for instance to “a growing body of research showing that costly,
extended out-of-home placements often fail to produce better outcomes
than alternative approaches.”288
The MacArthur Foundation also played a role. This foundation is
recognized for its role in funding and promoting adolescent brain
development research which informed the Supreme Court’s line of cases
limiting the most severe punishments for children tried in criminal
court.289 Its Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile

285. Limiting pre-trial detention has empirical support analogous to that supporting other reforms
discussed in this Article. E.g., infra notes 419–420 and accompanying text. Foundations have
similarly worked for limiting use of pre-trial detention. E.g., Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative
(JDAI), ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., https://www.aecf.org/work/juvenilejustice/jdai/ [https://perma.cc/3 MFN-3W63].
286. See State Juvenile Justice Work, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2016/02/juvenile-justice-work
[https://perma.cc/Z7WF-JJR4] (listing its work in Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, South Dakota,
and West Virginia). Pew has published reports on juvenile justice reforms in most of the states
discussed in sections II.A to II.C. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., GEORGIA’S 2013 JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM (2013) [hereinafter GEORGIA’S JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM], https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs/content-level_pages/reports/georgia20201320juvenile20justice20
reform20summary20briefjuly2013pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPY6-PDSA]; PEW CHARITABLE TRS.,
HAWAII’S 2014 JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM: NEW LAW WILL STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION AND REDUCE SECURE CONFINEMENT (2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/issue-briefs/2014/07/hawaiis-2014-juvenile-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/Q72JCB3M]; PEW CHARITABLE TRS., KANSAS’ 2016 JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM (2017),
https://pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2017/06/eorgi-2016-juvenile-justicereform [https://perma.cc/JKE3-T88H?type=image]; PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 241; PEW
CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 196; BENDING THE CURVE, supra note 145 (Texas); PEW CHARITABLE
TRS., supra note 200; PEW CHARITABLE TRS., WEST VIRGINIA’S 2015 JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM
(2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/05/west-virginias2015-juvenile-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/9ZEJ-2BH6]. Pew Charitable Trusts notes its own
“technical assistance” to reform-focused commissions in those states. E.g., GEORGIA’S JUVENILE
JUSTICE REFORM, supra, at 1.
287. See, e.g., GEORGIA’S JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 286, at 1 (noting involvement of
Pew Charitable Trust, Annie E. Casey Foundation, and Crime & Justice Institute in developing
Georgia’s reforms).
288. SHOENBERG, supra note 190, at 1.
289. Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy:
Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 282 (2013); David S.
Tanenhaus, The Fierce Urgency of Now and Then, 44 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 774 (2019).
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Justice led to the Pathways to Desistance Study,290 which contributed to
research showing reduced value of longer-term incarceration of
children.291 That research, in turn, was cited by the Pew Charitable Trusts
in its reports supporting reforms in the states described above.292
Other foundations and think tanks have offered similar reform
prescriptions to Pew and to the states surveyed in this section. Prior to
states enacting reforms discussed in this section, the Annie E. Casey
Foundation published a white paper whose title set a clear reform agenda:
No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration.293 The
foundation condensed a set of research to show that juvenile incarceration
is “dangerous, ineffective, unnecessary, obsolete, wasteful, and
inadequate,” and tying reduced juvenile incarceration rates with improved
public safety.294 It described offense-based limits on when judges can
incarcerate children as “[t]he most direct strategy for reducing the
populations of juvenile correctional facilities.”295 The Justice Policy
Institute has also endorsed diverting more cases, prohibiting incarceration
of children for relatively minor offenses, and shortening the length of stay
for children who are incarcerated.296
III. EVALUATING JUVENILE COURT INTAKE AND
SENTENCING REFORMS
Given the juvenile court’s historical commitment to highly
discretionary offender intake and sentencing decisions, and the tough-oncrime era use of offense-specific reforms to further punitive reforms, a
close evaluation of the reforms described in Part II is in order. This Part
argues, first, that these recent reforms are a significant break from both of
those historical precedents. Second, this Part argues that while these
reforms are offense-specific like tough-on-crime era reforms, a range of
290. Pathways to Desistance: A Study of Serious Adolescent Offenders as They Transition to
Adulthood and Out of Crime: Context, CTR. FOR RSCH. ON HEALTH CARE DATA CTR.,
https://www.pathwaysstudy.pitt.edu/context.html [https://perma.cc/64LR-HE9R].
291. For instance, one leading study showing that longer incarceration does not lead to lower
recidivism used the Pathways to Desistance study data. Loughran et al., supra note 200, at 700–01.
292. SHOENBERG, supra note 190, at 1 (citing “a growing body of research showing that costly,
extended out-of-home placements often fail to produce better outcomes than alternative approaches”).
293. THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE
INCARCERATION (2011), https://www.aecf.org/resources/no-place-for-kids-full-report/
[https://perma.cc/453D-3U5D].
294. Id. at 5.
295. Id. at 28.
296. JUST. POL’Y INST., RAISE THE AGE: SHIFTING TO A SAFER AND MORE EFFECTIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 17–19, 34 (2017), http://www.justicepolicy.org/research/11239 [https://perma.cc/9
RXC-ZVWH].
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important differences create clear demarcations from them. Moreover,
this Part argues that these reforms go significantly beyond the criminal
court sentencing reforms triggered by the “children are different” line of
U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment cases.
Not only are these reforms different from previous reform eras, they
represent a long overdue substantive regulation of juvenile court intake
and sentencing decisions. If Gault was the “first step” of “cleansing”
juvenile court of concerning practices,297 these reforms of intake and
sentencing power represent an essential second step. The juvenile justice
field has long focused on procedural questions rather than substantive
limits on how the justice system should respond to children who commit
crimes.298 These recent reforms take on that task, placing rehabilitative
goals and developmental evidence at the center of the reform project.
Relatedly, these reforms hold the potential to improve longstanding
problems of racial injustice in the juvenile justice system—although the
empirical outcomes thus far are inconclusive.299
Finally, this Part addresses one of the most important developments
caused by offense-specific intake and sentencing statutes in practice—the
increased importance of plea bargaining, and the risks that flow from it.
Emphasizing the specific offense for which a child is adjudicated makes
the process for identifying that offense more important. As in criminal
court, usually that process begins with prosecutors exercising charging
discretion and ends with plea bargaining. That process comes with a large
share of critics in criminal court,300 and this Part will analyze how those
criticisms could play out—and are somewhat mitigated—in juvenile court
under recent reform regimes.
A.

A Dramatic Shift from Juvenile Court Origins and Tough-onCrime Reforms

The focus of recent reforms on specific offenses is a significant shift
away from the juvenile justice system’s historical and theoretical
commitment to individualized offender-based decisions. These reforms
move away from the discretionary, offender-based dispositional structure
that remains the norm in most states today.301

297. Baharanyi & Hertz, supra note 91, at 10.
298. Tanenhaus, supra note 289, at 771.
299. See infra notes 366–370 and accompanying text.
300. See infra notes 376–383 and accompanying text.
301. Cf. SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 157 (describing offense-based disposition—at least when
coupled with an explicit endorsement of punishment as a purpose, “is often anathema in the juvenile
justice system”).
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The more involved question is whether and how these reforms differ
from offense-based statutes adopted during the tough-on-crime era, and,
relatedly, whether recent reforms might provide the foundation for more
punitive reforms in some future era. Several factors render this reform
trend significantly different from the offense-based sentencing reforms of
the tough-on-crime era.
First, the context of reforms significantly differs. The tough-on-crime
era featured reduction of juvenile court jurisdiction and expansion of
criminal court jurisdiction over children, with the express purpose of
imposing more adult sentences on children.302 The present era features the
exact opposite—state legislatures are expanding juvenile court
jurisdiction for the express purpose of imposing more developmentally
appropriate and rehabilitative sentences on children. Eleven states have
done this primarily by raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction; where
seventeen-year-olds (or, in some states, sixteen-year-olds) were formerly
charged in criminal court, they are now presumptively charged in juvenile
court, dramatically reducing the number of children tried in criminal court
and expanding the number of children in juvenile court.303 One additional
state has enacted similar legislation which is set to take effect in October
2021.304 In addition, multiple states have reformed their waiver laws to
either limit the cases in which children may be waived,305 or change the
procedure to do so by limiting legislative or prosecutorial waiver.306
Second, recent reforms impose limits on severe consequences,
especially for more minor offenses, rather than authorizing or requiring
more severe consequences for more severe offenses. They are thus the
inverse of tough-on-crime era reforms. Where tough-on-crime era reforms
302. See supra notes 96–110 and accompanying text.
303. JEREE THOMAS, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST., RAISING THE BAR: STATE TRENDS IN KEEPING
YOUTH OUT OF ADULT COURTS (2015–2017), at 10 (2018), http://www.campaignforyouth
justice.org/images/StateTrends_Repot_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM2N-6RTQ] (listing ten such
states). The eleventh state, Missouri, enacted a law defining children as anyone under eighteen, with
an effective date of January 1, 2021. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.021(2) (2021) (defining “child”); id.
§ 211.439. That law also included a funding contingency. Id. § 211.438. Some prosecutors are
challenging whether that contingency has been met. Missouri Law Raising Adult Age for Crimes to
18 Not Used, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 19, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/legislature-michaelbrown-st-louis-kansas-crime-4369997d5a814c80bd2 b68294a2c7ab8 (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
304. Act of Oct. 31, 2019, ch. 4 § 1, 2019 Mich. Pub. Acts 1–2. Michigan’s statute will define a
child as anyone under eighteen. Id. § 27.
305. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a)(1) (West 2019) (prohibiting waiver of children
under sixteen); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-19-20(1), 63-19-1210(4) (2019) (raising from sixteen to
seventeen statutory exclusion from the definition of “child” when facing certain felony charges and
the minimum age for judicial waiver for certain offenses).
306. The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 § 4, 2016 Cal. Stat. 1 (codified as amended
at CAL. WELF. & INST. Code § 602) (striking offense-based exclusions from juvenile
court jurisdiction).
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imposed mandatory minimum consequences, “children are different” era
reforms create limits on maximum consequences. Tough-on-crime
reforms thus prohibited offender-specific considerations from leading to
more lenient punishments, while children-are-different era reforms ensure
those considerations cannot lead to overly harsh punishments.
Third, the present reform project applies social science research, a
hallmark of the “children are different” line of cases and related
reforms.307 But it uses a different body of research—not only adolescent
psychology, but research evaluating intake and sentencing decisions
based on how effectively they help children avoid reoffending. A variety
of social science evidence challenging the wisdom of tough-on-crime era
reforms “fell short” of convincing courts to change laws or practice when
courts elect to defer to legislative judgments, so present juvenile court
sentencing reform efforts target legislatures, which may be showing more
institutional openness to such evidence.308
This social science evidence of the potential harms of too much
intervention in children’s lives309 adds support for what the IJA-ABA
proposed in 1980. That proposal called for offense-specific maximum
limits on juvenile court sentences, which it justified, in part, “by the logic
of the principle of limited intervention.”310 Rather than a conviction
opening the door for whatever intervention a juvenile court judge thinks
best, a “limited intervention” recognizes that unchecked interventions can
unnecessarily curtail children’s liberty and result in severe harm. Armed
with research showing, for instance, that longer periods of incarceration
do not aid rehabilitation and can harm children,311 calls for more limited
interventions carried even more force in the 2010s than in the 1980s.
Relatedly, such research underscores a consensus that the juvenile
justice system’s primary purpose is to rehabilitate children who have
committed crimes.312 Advocacy for reforms limiting the length of
307. The Supreme Court emphasized developmental science in each of its recent line of juvenile
sentencing Eighth Amendment cases. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70, 573 (2005); Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–73 (2012).
308. Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 189, 198–99 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014)
(describing judicial deference to legislatively enacted waiver schemes regardless of
developmental evidence).
309. See supra notes 162–170, 200–202, 224–232, 249–258 and accompanying text.
310. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 40.
311. Loughran et al., supra note 200, at 722, 726; Goldstein et al., supra note 230, at 172.
312. State statutes evidence the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system. See, e.g.,
Comparative & Multi-Jurisdictional Data: Juvenile Justice Purpose Clauses–Multi-Jurisdiction
Survey, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR. (Jan. 2014), https://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/stateprofiles/multi-jurisdiction-data/ [https://perma.cc/4NVA-2ADL] (click “Juvenile Justice Purpose
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incarceration, for instance, emphasize the impact of incarceration length
on future offending.313 The finding that longer sentences do not reduce
recidivism makes the policy choice obvious. Following those goals, it is
far wiser to spend limited resources on services in the community which
can reduce recidivism rather than on expensive secure facilities. Notably,
this line of thinking deemphasizes retribution as a purpose of juvenile
court sentences, contrasting significantly with tough-on-crime
era reforms.314
Fourth, the reforms do not simply require offense-based considerations.
They use such considerations to limit the power of the actors who had the
most discretion at different stages—prosecutors at intake and judges at
disposition. In the tough-on-crime era, reforms diminished family court
judges’ authority and enhanced prosecutors’. The current reform trend,
taken as a whole, imposes limits on individual actors’ discretion at each
stage. Prosecutors and defense attorneys have a greater ability to control
dispositions by negotiating particular plea bargains where the admitted
offense can control possible disposition outcomes. But the reforms also
expand juvenile court judges’ authority over intake by providing more
opportunities for defense attorneys to raise objections to prosecutors’
decisions to deny diversion and prosecute a child, and thus represent a
limitation on prosecutors’ authority at that stage.315
B.

Beyond “Children Are Different” and Towards a “Developmental
Approach”316 to Juvenile Justice Law

Recent juvenile court intake and sentencing reforms go significantly
beyond the Supreme Court’s “children are different” juvenile sentencing
quartet, decided between 2005 and 2016.317 Those cases set Eighth
Amendment limits on criminal court sentences imposed on children based
Clauses–Multi-Jurisdiction Survey” from the list) (analyzing and compiling state statutes’ juvenile
justice purpose clauses). Only six state statutes “emphasize punishment,” and the remainder
emphasize rehabilitation or a balance between rehabilitation, accountability, and public safety.
Id. at 1.
313. See supra notes 163–165, 200–202 and accompanying text.
314. E.g., Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691,
696 (1991).
315. Family courts in some jurisdictions have long had some such authority. See D.C. SUPER. CT.
JUV. R. 47-I(d) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:10 (2021) (authorizing the family court to,
sua sponte or on a party’s motion, refer children to diversion programs); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 315.2
(McKinney 2021) (permitting family court to dismiss in furtherance of justice); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6319-1410(A)(7) (2019) (permitting family court to dismiss a case at any time).
316. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 45, 184.
317. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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on children’s lesser culpability compared to adults.318 Collectively, those
cases have prohibited the juvenile death penalty in all cases, and juvenile
life without parole sentences in all but the most severe homicide cases,
with ongoing questions focused on standards and procedures before courts
impose juvenile life sentences.319 More broadly, the Court’s insistence
that “children are different,”320 coupled with the Court’s endorsement of
scientific evidence explaining those differences,321 has inspired a range of
important reforms regarding children in criminal courts,322 and in parole
and re-sentencing decisions for adults serving long sentences for crimes
committed as children.323
But, like the Supreme Court’s due process era cases,324 this string of
cases says nothing about juvenile court intake or dispositions. Its mandate
is for criminal courts to consider youth as mitigation at sentencing and

318. See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text.
319. For instance, the Court held that sentencing courts must consider the features of a defendant’s
youth but need not find the child is “permanently incorrigible” before imposing a sentence of life
without parole. Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311, (2021). Although serious
questions exist whether this ruling is consistent with Miller and Montgomery, see id. at 1328
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing Jones as “[c]ontrary to explicit holdings” in Miller and
Montgomery), the majority reaffirmed both cases, id. at 1321–22 (majority opinion). Jones addressed
neither less severe criminal court sentences nor any sentences in juvenile court. Both Jones’s holding
rejecting an Eighth Amendment challenge to a juvenile life without parole sentence, and its language
noting states’ various responses to the Court’s sentencing holdings, id. at 1323, suggest that future
changes will occur in the states, not the Supreme Court.
320. The Miller Court used several variations of this phrase. It described the Roper line of cases’
core as “establish[ing] that children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing
purposes.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 461. Miller described its particular holding as requiring criminal courts
“to take into account how children are different” before imposing a life without parole sentence. Id.
at 480. In support of applying Eighth Amendment protections to life without parole sentences and not
only death penalty sentences, it observed that while, as previous death penalty decisions held, “‘death
is different,’ children are different too. Indeed it is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of
exception for children.” Id. at 481 (emphasis in original).
321. See id. at 471–72 (describing social science relied upon by the Roper line of cases).
322. For instance, the Sentencing Project counted thirty-two state legislative reforms to laws
governing sentencing of children convicted of homicide in criminal court since 2012, with many
banning life without parole sentences. JOSH ROVNER, THE SENT’G PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/J
uvenile-Life-Without-Parole.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6VS-QH65].
323. See, e.g., Kristen Bell, A Stone of Hope: Legal and Empirical Analysis of California Juvenile
Lifer Parole Decisions, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 455, 461–68 (2019) (describing the connection
between Supreme Court’s juvenile life without parole cases and parole decisions for those serving
sentences for crimes committed as children); In re Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wash. 2d 255, 266, 474
P.3d 524, 530 (2020) (holding retroactive decision requiring criminal courts to consider children’s
youthfulness as mitigation at sentencing, thus permitting many children serving criminal court
sentences to seek resentencing).
324. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
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especially when a life sentence is an option.325 That command requires at
least some amount of offender-specific considerations (especially
including an offender’s youth) in criminal court sentencing. But that
offender-specific push is limited to children tried as adults in criminal
courts and generally subject to adult criminal sentences, and, in particular,
those tried and sentenced as adults for the most severe offenses—a
relatively small group compared to children tried in juvenile courts.326
This mandate is supported by our improved understanding of how
adolescents are less blameworthy and less susceptible to the deterrent
effects of punishment.327
That mandate does not necessarily translate to any reforms in juvenile
court because being in juvenile court is the result of the state recognizing
children’s differences from adults. Juvenile court judges were already
supposed to use their discretion to consider the child’s youth and capacity
for rehabilitation in determining a dispositional order.328 In juvenile court,
retribution and deterrence were supposed to be secondary concerns to
rehabilitation.329 Nothing in the children-are-different line of cases says
anything about juvenile court sentencing. In a narrow sense then, the
children-are-different line of cases may reaffirm how children are
different and thus why having separate juvenile courts is wise, but it does
not change what actually happens in those courts.
Similarly, most commentary summarizing “children are different” era
reforms do not identify an impact on juvenile court sentencing. For
instance, a leading juvenile justice scholar’s book devotes a long section
to the “children are different” era and its reforms, a chapter to children’s
reduced culpability and related pressures for relatively less severe
criminal court sentences, and teenagers’ “competence to exercise
procedural rights.”330 But those sections have no discussion of sentencing
reforms in juvenile court. Other discussions of the children-are-different

325. The individual cases at issue in Miller both involved children tried and sentenced as adults in
criminal court, and that transfer of jurisdiction opened up the children to the potential of a life without
the possibility of parole sentence. Miller, 567 U.S. at 466, 468–69.
326. The federal government reported that in 2018, 1.5% of cases involving children sixteen or
seventeen and 0.2% of cases of younger children were waived from juvenile to criminal court. OFF.
OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUVENILE COURT
STATISTICS 40 (2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/njcda/pdf/jcs2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9
WE-TDCF].
327. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–72 (describing children’s lesser culpability as a foundation of
Roper line of cases).
328. Supra notes 37–49 and accompanying text.
329. Id.
330. FELD, supra note 22, at 193–272.
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line of cases and its impact are similar.331
The “children are different” rationale and the developmental evidence
relied upon by the Supreme Court have impacted juvenile justice reform
efforts beyond the Court’s specific criminal court sentencing holdings.
Invoking such developmental evidence is now commonplace in reform
efforts, including efforts closely related to those described in Part II, such
as efforts to improve the effectiveness of juvenile probation.332 But such
reliance on evidence of children’s differences is not new for juvenile
court; the entire point of juvenile court is that children’s development
renders the adult justice system inappropriate for them.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the “children are different”
concept is not new. In 2010—after deciding two of its four “children are
different” sentencing cases—the Court held in J.D.B. v. North Carolina333
that age matters in determining whether a child suspect is in custody for
Miranda334 purposes, just as it does for Eighth Amendment sentencing
purposes.335 But rather than echo the developmental language of the
Eighth Amendment cases, Justice Sotomayor in J.D.B. v. North Carolina
cited the “commonsense reality” that children are different.336 Justice
Sotomayor went on to cite an older line of Supreme Court cases for the
proposition that “[a] child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’”337
Even J.D.B.’s citations make clear that the children-are-different line of
cases did not break new ground in declaring that children are different and
instead built on older cases; Sotomayor cited an earlier case, then included
Roper v. Simmons,338 the first of the children-are-different line, in a string
331. See, e.g., CARA H. DRINAN, THE WAR ON KIDS: HOW AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE LOST ITS
WAY 132–53 (2018) (describing reform agenda focused on sentences of children in criminal court);
Maroney, supra note 308, at 189 (describing “children are different” era reforms as relating to limits
on criminal court sentences and transferring children back from criminal to juvenile court, but not
listing any juvenile court disposition reforms); Eduardo Ferrer, A New Juvenile Jurisprudence: How
Adolescent Development Research and Relentless Defense Advocacy Revolutionized Criminal Law
and Jurisprudence, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM: 50 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 51 (Kristin Henning, Laura Cohen & Ellen Marrus eds., 2018)
(describing, as its title indicates, impacts on “criminal law,” not juvenile law); ELIZABETH SCOTT,
THOMAS GRISSO, MARSHA LEVICK & LAURENCE STEINBERG, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE SENTENCING 25–29 (2015), http://www.modelsforchange.net/publi
cations/778 [https://perma.cc/4ARL-5H9F] (focusing discussion of “children are different” cases’
implications on “criminal sentencing” and related reforms).
332. E.g., Goldstein et al., supra note 230, at 171 (critiquing “misalignment between probation
expectations and youths’ developmental decision-making capacities”).
333. 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
334. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
335. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 265.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 272 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
338. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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cite of cases in “accord.”339
Justice Sotomayor suggested that one element of the analysis that was
new by the time of Roper—the expanded scientific knowledge of
psychological and neurological development through adolescence and
early adulthood—was not all that important.340 To Sotomayor, reliance on
such scientific evidence was unnecessary because the reality that children
are different is “self-evident to anyone who was a child once . . . including
any police officer or judge.”341 She went on to note, without support from
developmental science, both that the Supreme Court repeatedly
recognized those differences, citing cases as far back as 1948, and that
legal authorities relied on the “assumption that children characteristically
lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an
incomplete ability to understand the world around them” since
Blackstone.342 Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama,343 Justice Kagan
echoed these points, noting that in addition to recent social science, the
Court’s recognition of children’s differences “rested . . . on common
sense,”344 and that many legal rules have long recognized
children’s differences.345
The key task of juvenile court intake and sentencing reforms is to take
these long-standing principles and apply them in juvenile court to serve
rehabilitative goals as effectively as possible. That task, undertaken in
state legislatures since 2013,346 requires a significant step beyond the
“children are different” cases, related criminal sentencing reforms, and
their underlying developmental evidence.
The legislative reforms discussed in this Article are a significant step
towards such a goal. These offense-specific reforms largely comport with
principles endorsed by the National Research Council’s (NRC) 2013 book
(published on the eve of the most recent burst of reform activity)
Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach.347 The NRC
book compiles and summarizes decades of research into adolescent
development and juvenile justice responses to create an authoritative
statement of principles for many juvenile justice policies.
An offense-specific sentencing structure likely implies to most
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273.
567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 481 (citing J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 274).
See supra sections II.A–C.
REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24.
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adolescent defendants that the sentence is a punishment for the specific
offense they committed. Crucially, however, that signal does not mean
offense-specific sentencing is inherently in tension with a rehabilitative
system. The NRC concluded that holding children accountable for
specific law violations is healthy for their development, so long as the
consequences are not overly punitive.348 Such punishment underscores the
wrongness of the conduct at issue in an easily-understood manner—better
than a punishment imposed with the more amorphous justification that an
authority figure thinks it is best for the child.349 Relatedly, the NRC also
focused on teenagers’ perceptions of the juvenile justice system,
recognizing that “perceptions of fairness on the part of youth and
families,” helps children rehabilitate.350 Developmentally, teenagers are
especially sensitive “to whether they and their peers have been treated
fairly by adults.”351 Teenagers will view the legal system as having more
legitimacy if they perceive that it has treated them fairly352—but, as Tom
Tyler and Rick Trinkner note, research shows that the opposite occurs.353
Those perceptions explain how proportionality between disposition
and offense can enhance rehabilitation. The “fact-based quality of the
decision-making process” is relevant to teens’ perceptions of fairness.354
Reliance on a clear fact that teens can understand—the severity of the
charge for which they are adjudicated—can thus enhance perceived
fairness of the resulting disposition. Juvenile justice scholar Barry Feld
recognized this element as a “silver lining” of the tough-on-crime era—a
recognition that the “affirmation of responsibility” for specific offenses is
a helpful corrective to the juvenile court’s historic view that adolescent
misdeeds are the product purely of children’s circumstances
and development.355
348. Id. at 4, 21, 46, 184.
349. Id. at 4, 46, 184; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 157 (describing research showing that
“restrained just-deserts objectives” may “foster prosocial development” in part because youth are
likely to understand offense-based dispositions well). This idea is not necessarily a new one. See, e.g.,
DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 133–34 (1964) (“Why should they [judges, prosecutors,
and other juvenile justice professionals] insist, as they frequently do, that it is not what he did—which
strikes delinquents and others as a sensible reason for legal intervention—but his underlying problems
and difficulties that guide court action?”).
350. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 21.
351. Id. at 121; see also id. at 128 (“[A]dolescents are very sensitive to perceived injustice.”).
352. See id. at 130 (describing research which “suggests that juveniles may be more likely to accept
responsibility for less serious offenses early in the process if they perceive delinquency proceedings
to be fair and transparent and any sanctions imposed to be proportionate to their offenses”).
353. TYLER & TRINKNER, supra note 249, at 201.
354. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 193.
355. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race and the “Crack
Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 390 (1999).
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As importantly, the NRC concludes that juvenile sentences must not be
disproportionate.356 In particular, juvenile justice systems must reserve
their most severe sanctions for a narrow range of cases; any “lengthy
confinement” should be limited to when that is “necessary to protect
society.”357 But the NRC proposed no offense-based limits on juvenile
court sentencing. Unnecessary incarceration or other overly punitive
actions is also ineffective because they reduce the system’s legitimacy in
teenagers’ minds, which undermines the system’s efforts at
reducing recidivism.358
The reforms discussed in this Article put the NRC’s principles into
practice. Their offense-specific nature makes clear that punishments are
tied to specific acts of wrongdoing. And the limits on those punishments
correct some of the disproportionately severe punishments that have been
possible under discretionary sentencing since the beginning of the
juvenile court,359 and made more prevalent under tough-on-crime
era reforms.360
C.

Racial Justice

Racial disparities have long plagued almost every stage of juvenile
justice cases. Most relevant for this Article, Black children especially, and
all children of color are more likely to be prosecuted (rather than diverted)
and placed in state custody (rather than released) than White children:
federal statistics show that in 2018, Black children’s cases were diverted
0.6 times as frequently as White children’s cases, and Black children were
placed in state custody 1.4 times as frequently as White children.361 A
wide body of literature documents the juvenile justice system’s
“differential processing” of children of color compared with White youth,
even accounting for children’s offenses and criminal histories.362 These
disparities may be particularly evident at intake for misdemeanor and nonviolent offenses, and in decisions to incarcerate at all levels of offense

356. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 127.
357. Id. at 184; see also id. at 128 (discussing proportionality as justifying more lenient
punishments in juvenile system as compared to criminal system, but not addressing proportionality
within the juvenile system).
358. TYLER & TRINKNER, supra note 249, at 201.
359. Supra sections I.A–I.B.
360. Supra section I.C.
361. OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., STATISTICAL BRIEFING
BOOK (2020), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/special_topics/qa11601.asp?qaDate=2018 [https://per
ma.cc/5F5C-SF7N].
362. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 228–29.
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severity,363 that is, at the very decision points that these reforms address.
It is possible—though far from clear—that more comprehensive
offense-based sentencing reforms could reduce some of these racial
disparities. The wide discretion historically exercised by judges at
sentencing and prosecutors at intake are, like any other discretionary
decision, subject to implicit bias.364 Professor Robin Walker Sterling, for
instance, argues that “children of color . . . require procedural formalities
as a shield against the discriminatory impact of unfettered discretion.”365
Empirically, however, it is not yet clear if existing reforms are having
this effect. An evaluation of Kentucky’s reforms found that both White
and Black children benefitted from the reforms, but disparities between
them did not decrease.366 One study concluded that Texas’s 2007 reforms,
which dramatically reduced the number of children in state facilities,
found that those reforms did not impact (positively or negatively) racial
disparities in state-level commitments, which were subject to offensebased limits.367 In West Virginia, another study noted that while, postreform, the juvenile justice system subjected fewer Black children to its
most invasive actions, significant disparities between Black and White
children remained.368 Existing work has shown that reducing the overall
arrest and incarceration rate for children (including doing so for all racial

363. Barrett & Katsiyannis, supra note 255, at 2052–53.
364. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 314, at 714 (“[I]ndividualized discretion is often synonymous with
racial disparities in sentencing.”); Robin Walker Sterling, A Broken Shield: A Plea for Formality in
the Juvenile Justice System, 13 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 237, 251–52 (2013)
(collecting studies showing prevalence of implicit biases in judgments of children in the juvenile
justice system).
365. Sterling, supra note 364, at 240; see also MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 180
(1996) (“There is, unfortunately, no way around the dilemma that sentencing is inherently
discretionary and that discretion leads to disparities.”).
366. Reforms reduced the number of children, Black and White, incarcerated, but did not reduce
the disparity between White and Black children; Black children were less likely overall to be
incarcerated, but remained more likely than White children. WESTAT, supra note 283, at 39–42. Some
commentators suggested that Kentucky’s reforms exacerbated disparities. CRIME & JUST. INST.,
CMTY. RES. FOR JUST., IMPLEMENTING COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE IMPROVEMENT IN
KENTUCKY 6 (2017), http://www.crj.org/assets/2017/10/KY-Brief-v9-10-25-17_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F6FP-HBDG]; Kate Howard, Kentucky Reformed Juvenile Justice, and Left Black
Youth Behind, WFPL NEWS LOUISVILLE (June 20, 2018), https://wfpl.org/kycir-kentucky-reformedjuvenile-justice-and-left-black-youth-behind/ [https://perma.cc/UFP2-UU4P].
367. FABELO ET AL., supra note 146, at 33.
368. DOUGLAS H. SPENCE, OFF. OF RSCH. & STRATEGIC PLAN., MEASURING DISPROPORTIONATE
MINORITY CONTACT IN WEST VIRGINIA’S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 8–9 (2018),
http://djcs.wv.gov/ORSP/Documents/2018DMC%20in%20WV%20Research%20Brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J2H5-H6WM]. The report did not evaluate whether the size of those disparities
changed following legislative reforms.
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groups) can still expand racial disparities.369 Other evaluations conclude
that enough data does not yet exist to draw conclusions about the impact
of legislative reforms on racial disparities.370 This essential topic requires
ongoing research. Reform states have reduced invasive actions like
incarceration by limiting discretion for key decisions.371 More research is
necessary to determine whether and how that strategy affects racial
disparities. If these reforms do not limit, or if they exacerbate, existing
disparities, research should explore why that is. Perhaps reforms preserve
enough discretion for disparities to continue, or shift discretion to
prosecutors. Such research could then support further racial justice
reform efforts.
Even if reforms do not reduce racial disparities in intake and
incarceration decisions, they may provide some benefit to a related set of
racial disparities in children’s sense of procedural justice—whether they
feel that the juvenile justice system has treated them fairly. Procedural
justice concerns are particularly strong for Black and other children of
color who may feel that they are on the receiving end of
“disproportionately harsh” consequences imposed on children of color.372
Indeed, some studies document that, especially for Black and Latinx
children, perceived fairness of the juvenile justice system declines the
more contact they have with it.373
D.

Emphasizing Plea Bargaining—and Prosecutors—More

The offense-based nature of recent reforms comes with clear benefits
to children. Historically and still in most states, a juvenile court judge
could impose any sentence regardless of the crime for which a child was
convicted. The judge’s options were the same whether the child was

369. JOSHUA ROVNER, THE SENT’G PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN YOUTH COMMITMENTS AND
ARRESTS 1 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-disparities-in-youthcommitments-and-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/L7W3-CS5U]; see also W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST., LOS
ANGELES COUNTY: YOUTH JUSTICE REIMAGINED: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LOS ANGELES
COUNTY YOUTH JUSTICE WORK GROUP 32 (2020), https://lacyouthjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/10/Youth-Justice-Reimagined-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NZG-HKD7] (illustrating how racial
disparities in Los Angeles juvenile justice have expanded as the overall number of petitions has
declined by nearly two-thirds).
370. SAMUEL GONZALES, KAYLA KANE, STEFANIE LOPEZ-HOWARD, HARINI DEVULAPALLI,
JAINIECYA HARPER & KYLE FITTS, GA. CRIM. JUST. COORDINATING COUNCIL, DISPROPORTIONATE
MINORITY CONTACT IN GEORGIA’S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 46 (2018), https://cjcc.georgia.gov/
document/full-analysis-available-here/download [https://perma.cc/AP39-CYHK] (“While any effect
HB 242 has on DMC [disproportionate minority contact] rates was yet to be seen . . . .”).
371. Supra notes 208–223, 280–284 and accompanying text.
372. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 130.
373. Id. at 193.
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convicted of assault and battery in the first, second, or third degree,374 or
of one, two, or three crimes. In practice, a judge could see that the state
alleged then dropped a more serious charge, assume (contrary to law) that
there is some truth to the charge, and sentence children accordingly. Or a
judge could conclude, as the juvenile court judge did in Gault, that a
child’s relatively minor offense still necessitated placement in a state
facility for a long period of time.375 Offense-specific reforms limit such
practices. Under those reforms, the specific charges adjudicated actually
constrain a judge’s authority to incarcerate a child and how long the judge
can keep a child on probation, and may even require authorities to divert
children’s cases. And even if a judge assumes dropped charges are true or
that a commitment to a state facility is needed to rehabilitate a child, the
judge’s authority to impose dispositions based on them is at least
somewhat limited.
The increased importance of the specific charges filed and adjudicated
increases the importance of plea bargaining, which risks the same
problems that have been well documented in criminal court. Prosecutors
choose what charges to file and prosecute, and, following offense-based
reforms, more severe charges provide prosecutors with greater discretion
when to prosecute or divert cases and greater leverage over the ultimate
sentence imposed.376 The threat of such sentences if the case proceeds to
trial provides the prosecutor with leverage to induce a guilty plea to a
lesser charge based on fear of a more severe penalty.377 The historic lack
of plea bargaining’s connection with juvenile courts’ ultimate disposition
has been a key element rendering prosecutors’ power in juvenile court
weaker than that in criminal court,378 and offense-based reforms remove
that element.
This scenario leads to several sets of concerns. First, it vests
tremendous power in prosecutors, who can effectively shape a defendant’s
sentence by crafting charges. Accordingly, limiting the sentencing
discretion of judges may simply shift the locus of powerful discretionary
decision-making from judges to prosecutors.379 Second, and relatedly,
374. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-600 (2021) (defining these three phrases and their
connection to different degrees of assault and battery).
375. Supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
376. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004) (noting the “menu” of options criminal law provides to prosecutors
which shape plea bargains).
377. E.g., Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining
Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67 (2005).
378. Franklin E. Zimring, The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer: A Mildly Revisionist
History of the 1990s, 71 LA. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2010).
379. See id. at 12 (describing plea bargaining as making prosecutors more powerful than judges).
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prosecutors have wide discretion to exercise this power,380 which can lead
to inequitable treatment of similarly situated defendants, including
differential treatment of defendants by their race or social class.381 Third,
the threat of more severe punishment can induce innocent defendants to
plead guilty, especially when offered a plea bargain with a relatively light
sentence.382 This concern is particularly powerful when defendants are
arrested and detained pre-trial for relatively low-level offenses and
pleading guilty is the fastest path to get out of jail.383 These risks may be
particularly acute when children are pressured to accept plea bargains
before courts appoint them counsel and when public juvenile defense
systems are lacking.384
Procedural differences between criminal and juvenile court may
provide juvenile court prosecutors with greater leverage. The Supreme
Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania385 that children do not have the
right to a jury trial in juvenile court,386 a case that has long been criticized,
including judges’ likely greater proclivity for convicting defendants than
juries.387 As such, prosecutors’ threat to bring a child to trial on more
severe charges if the child will not plead guilty to a lesser charge may
come with greater force in juvenile court.
Indeed, there is reason for concern that shifting to offense-based
sentencing creates incentives for juvenile court prosecutors to change
380. E.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464, 2476 (2004) (describing the lack of “checks” on prosecutorial authority related to plea
bargaining resulting from the lack of public trials).
381. E.g., Sterling, supra note 364.
382. Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON.
353 (2006).
383. John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who
Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 173–75 (2014). Indeed, scholars have suggested that
prosecutors would not even charge many marginal cases against defendants if prosecutors lacked
confidence they could elicit a plea bargain. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea
Bargain) Dilemma, 33 REGULATION 42 (2010).
384. See, e.g., NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., ACCESS DENIED: A NATIONAL SNAPSHOT OF STATES’
FAILURE TO PROTECT CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 10, 25–26 (2017) (describing limited access
to counsel in many juvenile courts and how forty-three states permit children to waive the right to
counsel without any consultation with counsel); Katayoon Majd & Patricia Puritz, The Cost of Justice:
How Low-Income Youth Continue to Pay the Price of Failing Indigent Defense Systems, 16 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 543 (2009) (examining barriers to accessing counsel and providing high
quality counsel to poor child defendants).
385. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
386. Id. at 528.
387. Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the
Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 568–69 (1998). While the
McKeiver plurality did not discuss the relative accuracy or fairness of jury and judge fact finding, id.
at 562, Guggenheim and Hertz engage in a detailed comparison, concluding that juries are more
accurate and fair, and less likely to convict, id. at 562–82.
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their behavior to look more like the much-criticized role of prosecutors in
criminal court plea bargaining.388 Some preliminary data suggests that
prosecutors have, in fact, responded to offense-specific sentencing
reforms by increasing the severity of charges filed.389 A federally funded
evaluation of the implementation of Kentucky’s reforms noted an increase
in the number of felony charges filed and the “potential for increase in
overcharging of youth.”390 While the causes of this increase are not yet
known with certainty,391 that data suggests prosecutors may respond to the
incentives created by offense-specific reforms by filing charges alleging
more severe offenses.
Nonetheless, several differences between juvenile and criminal court
structure mitigate the risk that this change in incentives will lead to the
same scale of concerns that appear in criminal court. Professor Franklin
Zimring’s 2010 observation—that “[w]hile prosecutors are much more
powerful in juvenile courts than they were a generation ago, they are still
less powerful in juvenile than in criminal courts”392—remains accurate
even under offense-based reforms. It remains that while prosecutors have
important powers, “they are not the sole determiners of juvenile justice
sanctions.”393
First, juvenile court prosecutors face more significant checks on their
prosecutorial discretion at intake than criminal court prosecutors do.
Much has been written on the power of criminal prosecutors,394 with a
particular concern about how charging powers drive criminal
adjudications, and the absence of significant limits on those powers from
other branches of government.395 Juvenile court prosecutors differ.

388. Supra notes 376–380.
389. SUZANNE O. KAASA, SARAH VIDAL, KRISTI MEADOWS, MEGAN FOSTER & NATHAN LOWE,
OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., KENTUCKY JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM
EVALUATION: IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION REPORT 18 (2019), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/254458.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6EU-ACZP].
390. Id.
391. See id. at 18–19 (describing possibility of overcharging due to reform, or possible increase in
school threats charges).
392. Zimring, supra note 378, at 9.
393. Id. at 12.
394. For an incomplete sampling, see Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874–87 (2009); JOHN F.
PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL
REFORM 127 (2017) (“Few people in the criminal justice system are as powerful, or as central to
prison growth, as the prosecutor.”); ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 8 n.16 (2007) (collecting sources critiquing prosecutorial power).
395. Indeed, academic proposals for regulating prosecutorial power have often focused on
administrative mechanisms. E.g., Barkow, supra note 394, at 887–906, 908; DAVIS, supra note 394,
at 19 (premised on the conclusion that courts will not impose meaningful checks on that power).
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Historically, it was the juvenile court judge who oversaw prosecutions and
probation officers who determined which cases would be prosecuted or
diverted,396 and even when much of that power shifted to prosecutors,
many courts maintained their ability to dismiss delinquency cases “for
social reasons.”397 This judicial oversight of intake is consistent with the
juvenile court’s rehabilitative focus; recognizing that unnecessary
prosecutions can undermine rehabilitation, juvenile justice authorities
have long embraced the importance of “judicious nonintervention.”398
Some reform packages discussed above extend oversight over
prosecutorial discretion, giving judges or other entities power to
determine if children will be prosecuted or diverted.399
Second, to the extent prosecutors’ leverage depends on their ability to
threaten defendants with more severe punishment through filing more
serious charges, juvenile court prosecutors have less leverage because
juvenile court sentences are relatively shorter, especially after the reforms
described in section II.A. While the absence of juries may make the
likelihood of conviction on more serious charges somewhat greater than
in criminal court,400 the consequences of such conviction are lower, and
thus the pressure on defendants to accept a plea bargain is reduced.
Not only are the possible sentences shorter than in criminal court,401
juvenile court sentencing generally lacks mandatory minimum sentences.
In the reform states discussed in Part II, sentencing reforms have
explicitly imposed maximums, not minimums. As a result, prosecutors
cannot threaten an automatic sentence triggered only by a conviction for
specific offenses; judges retain discretion to determine the particular
sentence imposed. The state’s and defendants’ bargaining power will
depend both on the strength of the state’s evidence on specific charges,
and on the strength (or weakness) of such arguments regarding the most
rehabilitative sentence—not the more inflexible power that long
mandatory minimum sentences create in criminal court. Moreover,
departments of juvenile justice or juvenile probation can recommend
396. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 17, at 761–65.
397. D.C. SUPER. CT. JUV. R. 7-I(d) (2020).
398. Edwin M. Lemert, The Juvenile Court—Quest and Realities, in TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, supra note 65, at 91, 96. Other scholars took this point
further, arguing for “radical nonintervention,” defined by the admonition “leave kids alone wherever
possible.” EDWIN M. SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTERVENTION: RETHINKING THE DELINQUENCY
PROBLEM 155 (1973) (emphasis in original).
399. See supra notes 271–279 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 386–387 and accompanying text.
401. This has always been true for the most serious charges. While, as discussed in section I.A,
juvenile court sentences for minor offenses could be greater than in criminal court, the reforms
described in sections II.A and II.B limit those sentences as well.
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particular sentences to the court, and need not follow prosecutors’
recommendation. Defense counsel may succeed in eliciting more
favorable sentencing recommendations from these departments, thus
blunting prosecutors’ power at sentencing.
These differences between juvenile and criminal court modestly
mitigate the risk that overly punitive or aggressive prosecutors could
undermine rehabilitative goals in juvenile justice systems with more
offense-based sentencing schemes. But the risk remains, and future
reform efforts should seek to keep prosecutorial authority in check.402
These differences between criminal and juvenile court should help
empower juvenile defense attorneys to advocate for their clients in a plea
bargaining setting effectively—but juvenile defense practice will need to
adjust. Presently, under offender-specific indeterminate sentencing,
juvenile defense manuals have emphasized that the normal benefit of plea
bargaining—reduced sentences guaranteed by a guilty plea to a lesser
offense—does not apply in juvenile court.403 As jurisdictions enact more
offense-specific sentencing reforms, that reality changes. Plea bargains
can now guarantee children will not face incarceration, shape how long
any potential incarceration could be, and shape how long the possible
length of juvenile probation can be.
One element of juvenile defense advocacy will remain—advocacy for
children at sentencing is essential.404 Children will not face mechanically
calculated sentences. Rather, they will face possible maximum sentences,
under which judges will retain significant discretion, rendering vigorous
advocacy essential.
As with the criminal system, concern about the quality of defense
advocacy and how that might impact plea bargaining is fair. Assessments
of state juvenile defense systems have revealed weak advocacy around the
country, including even defense attorneys agreeing to state sentencing
recommendations without offering alternatives.405 Improving public
defense systems, while necessary, is beyond the scope of this Article. For
this Article’s purposes, it suffices to note that vigorous defense is essential
to mitigate the risks of a plea bargaining under reformed systems, even
402. Consistent with this focus, Franklin Zimring and David Tanenhaus list limiting prosecutorial
power as the first item on a “shopping list for change” in a 2014 book. Franklin E. Zimring & David
S. Tanenhaus, On Strategy and Tactics for Contemporary Reforms, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 122, at 216.
403. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 51, at 387.
404. Disposition advocacy is an emphasized part of juvenile defense practice. E.g., NAT’L JUV.
DEF. CTR., JUVENILE DEFENDER DISPOSITION PRACTICE TOOL (2017), https://njdc.info/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/NJDC-Disposition-Practice-Tool.pdf [https://perma.cc/F84U-82NR].
405. See REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 203; NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note
384, at 25; Majd & Puritz, supra note 384, at 552–58.
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though the reduced penalties mitigate the risks to most defendants.
IV. REFORM MOVING FORWARD
Bolder reforms can have greater impacts. Intuitively, reforms limited
to certain options—like commitments to state-run facilities while
permitting commitments to other facilities—will reduce the number of
incarcerated children less than reforms focused on any kind of out-ofhome placement. Similarly, this Part posits that reforms that limit intake
and disposition options across procedural stages and across a range of
offenses will have the broadest impact. As the reform trend discussed in
this Article has grown, reform legislation has grown more comprehensive.
The scope of reforms should continue to expand. This Part outlines several
suggestions for such reforms.
First, as Part II’s description of legislative changes makes clear, not
every element of reform is present in every state engaging in such reform.
While limits on incarceration’s availability and length are common
elements, other pieces—especially limits on probation length and
intake—feature in a smaller numbers of states’ reform packages. All
elements are important, including offense-based limits on incarceration,
length of incarceration, length of probation, and intake decisions.
Limiting which cases are to be prosecuted is particularly important. The
process of prosecuting a child can be the punishment,406 and in many cases
that punishment serves the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative goals
less effectively than diversion.407 The intake decision should entail
consideration not only of what offenses may be proven but also whether
prosecuting a particular child for a particular offense serves the juvenile
court’s rehabilitative mission, and whether diversion or dismissal serves
it better. There is little reason to think prosecutors have the training or
orientation necessary to make the latter set of decisions without any
review, and unchecked authority allows prosecutors to use the juvenile
court process as a counterproductive means of punishing children accused
of low-level offenses. By creating presumptive or absolute bars to
prosecuting certain offenses, legislatures can codify the importance of
these decisions and ensure that they follow research showing the benefits
of diversion.
Enhancing a check on unlimited prosecutorial authority over these
intake decisions is also essential to the juvenile justice system. Criminal
trial juries are explicitly envisioned in the criminal system as checks on

406. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 249–256 and accompanying text.
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the power of prosecutors.408 The Supreme Court has described juries as
providing “an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”409 And
when the Court denied children in juvenile court a constitutional right to
a jury, it emphasized the different way juvenile court intake was supposed
to protect children.410 But we are left with a scenario in which prosecutors
have increased power over intake decisions, and have increased the
proportion of cases prosecuted rather than diverted.411 Absent a jury,
juvenile court judges must have oversight over intake decisions.412
That prosecutorial authority, in particular, requires a check because
offense-based sentencing reforms increase the importance of plea
bargaining, and with it the risks associated with overzealous prosecution.
Those risks can exist even with offense-based limits on intake. Two states
which in recent years have limited when prosecutors may prosecute
particular cases—Utah and South Dakota—imposed offense-based limits,
while maintaining wide discretion.413 In Utah, that discretion exists in
cases not subject to mandatory diversion obligations, and in South Dakota,
that discretion exists in all cases (as it only presumptively calls for
diversion in some cases).414 The question remains how such discretion is
to be exercised, and how it can be reviewed by juvenile court judges, and
those reforms do not offer a clear answer.
I have separately argued that an agency model would lend itself to more
meaningful oversight of prosecutorial intake decisions with clearer
standards.415 Under an agency model, juvenile justice agencies, rather than
elected prosecutors’ offices, would have the power to determine whether
to prosecute children in juvenile court, subject to a set of legislative and
administrative standards which defense attorneys could enforce in
juvenile court. Those agencies would be better equipped than prosecutors’
408. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
409. Id.; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 552 (1971) (White, J., concurring)
(noting that in criminal court, juries serve as “a buffer to the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor”).
410. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 552 (1971) (White, J., concurring) (“To the extent that the jury is a
buffer to the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor in the criminal law system, the distinctive intake
policies and procedures of the juvenile court system to a great extent obviate this important function
of the jury.”). The concurring opinions are particularly important because the plurality opinion
attracted only four votes. Id. at 529.
411. See supra notes 69–70.
412. The IJA-ABA proposed that judges have “discretionary dismissal” power in 1980, explaining
that judges should have “discretionary authority to ameliorate the harsh results that may attend strict
application of the criminal law, a function informally but effectively served by the jury in adult
criminal proceedings.” JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 12–13.
413. See supra notes 264–272.
414. Id.
415. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 17.
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offices to consider a range of factors important to a rehabilitative system.
As the agency that would have a child on its probation docket or house
the child in its facilities, it would be better positioned than an elected
prosecutor’s office to determine the best use of its limited resources.
Agencies have more multi-disciplinary staff than prosecutors’ offices,
which may shift their determinations regarding what interventions are
needed. Agencies or legislatures could draft the standards to determine
whether to prosecute individual children, and defendants could enforce
those standards by challenging decisions to prosecute in front of juvenile
court judges. Such a model—or any alternative method to impose
procedural checks and substantive standards on each juvenile court intake
decision—is particularly important as plea bargaining, and thus the initial
charging decision, becomes even more impactful on juvenile
delinquency cases.
Second, states should add offense-based reforms to pre-trial detention
statutes to their legislative packages. In most states, children generally
lack the right or practical ability to seek release based on bail or bond
payments.416 Instead, state laws generally render some children eligible
for pre-trial and provide authorities—initially police or prosecutors, and
then judges—discretion to decide whether to detain them.417 Even when
some offense-specific limits exist on this discretion, the discretion
remains wide.418 Legislatively restricting who can be detained pre-trial is
important for multiple reasons. Just as unnecessary incarceration at
sentencing undermines rehabilitation, so does unnecessary pre-trial
detention. A 2020 study found that detaining children pre-trial was
associated with a 33% increase in felony recidivism and an 11% increase
in misdemeanor recidivism within one year.419 That effect was particularly
416. See, e.g., Morris v. D’Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 137 (R.I. 1980) (holding children have no right
to bail under state constitution). The National Juvenile Defender Center has counted nineteen states
that permit the use of cash bail, but that “[w]here bail is a legal ‘right,’ it is often not a reality.” NAT’L
JUV. DEF. CTR., A RIGHT TO LIBERTY: REFORMING JUVENILE MONEY BAIL 3, 6–8 (2019),
https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/NJDC_Right_to_Liberty.pdf [https://perma.cc/84Q3UYAR].
417. Martin Guggenheim has summarized how post-Gault advocacy efforts to regulate this
discretion ultimately failed when the Supreme Court decided Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984),
upholding a state statute permitting juvenile court judges to detain children based on their conclusion
that they posed a risk of future offending. Guggenheim, supra note 83, at 92–95.
418. For instance, South Carolina’s pre-trial detention statute makes children eligible for detention
whenever they face any criminal charge (no matter how minor) and either have any other pending
charge (no matter how minor) or are on probation for any charge (again, no matter how minor) and
“ha[ve] no suitable alternative placement.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-820(B)(2)(a), (B)(7) (2021).
419. Sarah Cusworth Walker & Jerald R. Herting, The Impact of Pretrial Juvenile Detention on
12-Month Recidivism: A Matched Comparison Study, 66 CRIME & DELINQ. 1865, 1865 (2020).
Felony recidivism was defined as facing any felony charges within the next twelve months, and
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strong for children with no or few prior offenses, suggesting a value in
using offense history as part of pre-trial detention criteria.420 Relatedly,
detaining children pre-trial limits their advocacy options: children lose
opportunities to enter any kind of treatment programs while living at home
in the community, and thus lose an argument for why they should remain
in the community rather than incarcerated.421
Moreover, the increased importance of plea bargaining following the
offense-based sentencing reforms makes pre-trial detention reform
particularly important as a tool to prevent plea bargaining problems.
Detaining a defendant pre-trial provides the state powerful leverage to
induce a plea from that defendant; accepting a plea becomes a ticket out
of the detention center.422 I and others who have represented children in
juvenile court have heard a common refrain from children locked up, even
for only one or two days: “I’ll plead to anything, just get me out.” The
best way to mitigate that risk is to reduce the number of children
incarcerated pre-trial. I suggest a pre-trial detention rule that mirrors postadjudication commitment procedures: as a general matter, if a child is not
charged with an offense that could lead to incarceration upon conviction,
the child should not be eligible for detention pre-trial.423
Third, states should include post-disposition reviews in reform
packages. When children are committed to state custody for relatively
long sentences (perhaps over six months and certainly over twelve) or
placed on long periods of probation (longer than twelve months), these
reviews can be essential tools to prevent unnecessarily long sentences.
They permit child defendants to argue that they have successfully
completed essential rehabilitative steps and reformed and so should be let
out, even if earlier than originally intended. Such an opportunity
incentivizes children to work with rehabilitative services. Facing a long
sentence with no opportunity to shorten it reduces those incentives. A
sentence that is not particularly long on the scale of criminal sentences
say, a twenty-four- or thirty-month sentence, remains significantly long
given an adolescent’s sense of time. Given a teenager’s relatively weaker

misdemeanor recidivism was defined as facing any misdemeanor charges within the next twelve
months. Id. at 1871.
420. Id. at 1876. The authors found that pre-trial detention increased the risk of felony recidivism
for children who had up to four prior offenses.
421. See Guggenheim, supra note 83, at 92.
422. See Bibas, supra note 380; see also NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., supra note 416, at 16.
423. Other limits on pre-trial detention are important as well, such as a requirement that less
restrictive alternatives are explored and ruled out before detaining a child.
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ability to look that far into the future,424 a rational response to such a
sentence is to reject rehabilitative services, and even to be less concerned
about misbehavior while incarcerated. Providing an opportunity to revisit
such long sentences with a strong record of rehabilitation mitigates this
risk. Potential review hearings also provide important oversight of
juvenile justice agencies to ensure they provide the services necessary to
fulfill the system’s rehabilitative purpose. In addition, given the reality
that most children who violate the law “will mature into adults with
different values,”425 a rehabilitative system should provide opportunities
for children incarcerated for a long period of time to demonstrate that this
maturation has occurred. For these reasons, the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges has endorsed post-disposition judicial
oversight of delinquency cases,426 and post-disposition legal
representation is recognized by the national juvenile defense bar and
scholars as an essential element of defending children.427
Finally, states should revisit children’s right to a jury trial. While the
Supreme Court has declared that the Constitution does not require states
to grant a jury trial, states are free to do so as a matter of state law, and a
small number do so.428 As noted above, scholars have convincingly argued
that denying children the right to trial by jury skews fact-finding in favor
of the state.429 That increases the power of prosecutors in plea bargaining
by making the threat of conviction on more severe charges at trial
stronger. While other factors somewhat mitigate the risk of pleabargaining abuses, states can further mitigate this risk by providing
children with the right to trials by jury.

424. E.g., Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCH. 1009, 1012 (2003).
425. Id. at 1015.
426. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, ENHANCED JUVENILE JUSTICE GUIDELINES:
IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE CASES ch. X (2019), https://www.ncjfcj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/NCJFCJ_Enhanced_Juvenile_Justice_Guidelines_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WEA-H6ZV]. This publication devotes two chapters to post-disposition review
hearings, one for children on probation and one for children in state custody. Id. at ch. IX & X.
427. NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENSE STANDARDS (2012),
https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/NationalJuvenileDefenseStandards2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3Q5-6B6K]; Sandra Simkins & Laura Cohen, The Critical Role of PostDisposition Representation in Addressing the Needs of Incarcerated Youth, 8 J. MARSHALL L.J.
311 (2015).
428. Those states include Alaska, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., JUVENILE RIGHT TO JURY
TRIAL CHART (2014), https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Right-to-Jury-Trial-Chart-7-1814.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WQH-3SRZ].
429. See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Problems with juvenile court sentencing have been apparent from the
court’s origins. Over 120 years, juvenile justice law’s gamble that
granting well-intended judges nearly unfettered discretion to determine
which children should be prosecuted versus diverted, and which
incarcerated versus released has not paid off. That system led to
inequitable treatment across jurisdictions and between individual
children, undermining the juvenile court’s rehabilitative mission through
inappropriately severe punishments and a system that teenagers could see
would not treat them fairly. When In re Gault imposed basic due process
protections on the adjudication phase of cases in, it left children to the
mercies of prosecutors who determined whether to prosecute them and to
judges who determined whether to incarcerate them.
More than fifty years later, an emerging legislative reform trend has
begun to provide the essential change that Gault left open. Gerald Gault
was charged, convicted, and incarcerated for a petty offense, and after
Gault, tough-on-crime era changes only increased the frequency of such
results that undermined the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative
mission. In states that lead this reform trend, future children in similar
situations will have stronger likelihoods of being diverted rather than
prosecuted and, if prosecuted and convicted, will have strong legal
protections against incarceration. These reforms, if they continue to
spread nationally, could have as dramatic an effect on juvenile justice
as Gault.
For some, these reforms are consistent with the view that the juvenile
justice system remains too punitive to succeed at its rehabilitative
mission—but a strong juvenile system separate from the criminal system
is nonetheless an essential tool to protect children from harsh sentences.430
By limiting sanctions, these reforms ensure that the juvenile system
provides a significantly less punitive response than criminal courts for
offenses of varying severity.
A more optimistic view is possible as well. Not only do these reforms
limit the harms that the juvenile justice system can impose through
unnecessarily punitive actions, they move the system closer to its
rehabilitative ideal. These reforms rest on a foundation of evidence about
what serves rehabilitative goals most effectively. They thus codifies a
shift of emphasis back towards rehabilitation by prohibiting actions
deemed inconsistent with or likely to undermine rehabilitation. That
rehabilitative emphasis mitigates the concern that an explicitly offense430. That is the view of the juvenile system’s importance expressed by Barry Feld in 2017, two
decades after he had advocated abolishing the juvenile court. Feld, supra note 118, at 329.
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specific disposition regime can set the stage for future retrenchment. The
central problem in tough-on-crime era reforms was not that they focused
on specific offenses, but that they “ignored developmental differences
between juveniles and adults”431 in a manner that undermined
rehabilitation. In contrast, the notion that children are different is
enshrined in Eighth Amendment law, and now codified in a growing body
of juvenile justice reform statutes. State legislatures should continue to act
so the number of such statutes increases.

431. REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 38.

